



European Crime Prevention Network Conference

Exchange of good practice in crime prevention between practitioners in the Member States concerning:

- Youth violence/ethnic minorities
- Domestic burglary - including its causes within the wider built environment
- Robberies motivated by drug addiction - especially in public places like the streets

October 7th - 8th 2002 in Aalborg, Denmark

Report – Volume 1



This is volume one of the Report to be published as the outcome of the EUCPN Conference, held during the Danish presidency, October 7th - 8th 2002 in Aalborg, Denmark.

Volume one: Presentations and Conclusions

Volume two: Best Practice Projects

The reports will be printed in a limited number of copies, and distributed to all participants of the conference. For other interested parties all material can be downloaded free of charge from our website:

www.crimprev.dk/eucpn

For further information on specific projects, use the contacts listed on top of each project description.

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Introduction

On 28 May 2001 the European Council decided to set up a European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN).

According to the Council Decision the EUCPN shall contribute to developing the various aspects of crime prevention activities at local and national level. Although covering all types of criminality, the Network shall pay particular attention to the fields of juvenile, urban and drug-related crime.

The EUCPN has now been a reality for more than one year, and after a period of time the network is now becoming more and more operational in its facilitation of exchanges of good and best practice in the field of crime prevention.

The Danish Presidency of the European Union on the 7 and 8 October 2002 hosted an EUCPN conference in the city of Aalborg in Denmark. More than 160 representatives from Ministries of Justice, Ministries of Interior, Police, Prosecution Services, Courts and practitioners from the EU Member States met at the conference arranged by the Danish Presidency of the European Union in very good co-operation with the EU Hippocrates Programme. Also representatives from Candidate Countries and EU-institutions were present at the conference.

The subject of the conference was "Exchange of good practice in crime prevention between practitioners in the Member States" and the conference focused on three crime problems as priority areas in the crime prevention effort:

- * Youth violence/ethnic minorities
- * Domestic burglary - including its causes within the wider built environment and
- * Robberies motivated by drug addiction - especially in public places like the streets

The conference was divided into two parts. The first part consisting of a plenary session and the second part consisting of five workshops. A number of highly qualified keynote speakers gave lectures, and in the workshops more than 40 examples of good crime prevention projects in these three fields in the 15 Member States was exchanged, highlighted and discussed.

Being Chairman of the EUCPN it is a pleasure for me to present the many impressions from the successful conference.

The report is split in 2 volumes. Volume 1 contains presentations and conclusions from the Aalborg conference and Volume 2 contains all the received good practice projects. The projects in volume 2 are also available on www.crimprev.dk/EUCPN.

Given the opportunity I wish to thank everyone, who was involved in the Aalborg conference for excellent co-operation. Without your support it would not have been possible to achieve the many fine results that the Aalborg conference in the future will be remembered for.

Best regards,

Arne Gram
Chairman of the EUCPN

Formanden for EUCPN

Arne Gram

Odinsvej 19, 2.

2600 Glostrup

Kære Arne Gram

Som du ved, er jeg desværre forhindret i at deltage i åbningen af European Crime Prevention Network Conference den 7. - 8. Oktober 2002 i Aalborg.

Det er første gang efter oprettelsen af Det Europæiske Kriminalpræventive Netværk, at man samler praktikere på det kriminalpræventive felt, og konferencen er efter min opfattelse et vigtigt skridt i retning af en optimering af erfaringsudvekslingen på det kriminalpræventive område i Europa.

Jeg synes, at vi med god grund kan være stolte over, at dette skridt tages under det danske formandskab, og jeg vil bede dig om at viderebringe denne hilsen til konferencedeltagerne i forbindelse med din åbningstale.

"Dear participants in the European Crime Prevention Network Conference!

Prevention of crime occupies a much higher place at the European agenda today than it used to do. We have all realized that prevention is better than cure.

The establishing of the European Crime Prevention Network is an important step within the European crime-preventive field. In this forum experiences may be profitably exchanged with regard to practice and individual projects.

It is important to involve practitioners also at a local level in the Member States to inspire each other to - inter alia - implement good quality crime prevention in policy and practice across the EU.

Therefore the Danish Presidency attaches great importance to this conference. The three topics of the conference, "Youth Violence/Ethnic Minorities", "Domestic Burglary", and "Robberies motivated by drug addiction" are all crimes which have serious consequences for the quality of social and economic life in all European countries.

It is my strong hope that this conference will contribute to a further strengthening of the crime preventive cooperation in Europe.

I welcome you to Aalborg and wish you all an inspiring and constructive conference."

Men venlig hilsen

Lene Espersen (signed)

Conference Programme

Sunday 6th October 2002:

Transportation from the airport to the hotel

Arrival to the hotel

Visit at the Danish Distilleries

Dinner between 18:00 and 21:30

Monday 7th October 2002

09.30 hours: Opening of the conference

Ms. Lene Espersen, Minister of Justice

Ms. Eva Smith, Chair of the Danish Crime Prevention Council

Mr. Arne Gram, Chair of the EUCPN

10:00 hours: Plenary Presentation - part 1

Mr. Flemming Balvig (Denmark), Professor in Sociology of Law, Faculty of Law at the University of Copenhagen "Stop Smoking! - Stop Crime?"

11.00 hours: Coffee break

11.30 hours: Plenary Presentation - part 2

Ms. Anna Constanza Baldry (Italy), PhD at the Department of Social Psychology at the University of Rome "la Sapienza": "School violence among Italian youth. From bullying to delinquency. Stepping stones for developing efficient preventing strategies"

12:30 - 14:00 hours: Lunch

14:00: Plenary Presentation - part 3

Ms. Hille Koskela (Finland), Ph.D. in planning geography, Senior Lecturer at the University of Helsinki: "Urban security politics: cultures of tolerance/ cultures of prejudice"

15:00 hours: Coffee break

15:30 hours: Plenary Presentation - part 4

Mr. Paul Ekblom (UK), PhD, Principal Research Officer, Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, London: "Towards a European Knowledge Base in Crime Prevention"

16:30 hours: Break

16:45 - 17:15 hours: Plenary

Picking up today's programme and introduction to the programme of tomorrow by Lars Rand Jensen, Chief of Police, Odense, Chairman of the Central SSP-Committee in the Danish Crime Prevention Council.

18:30 hours: Welcome drink at the hotel lobby

19:00 - 24:00 hours: Keynote Dinner

Speaker: Ms. Eva Smith, Professor and Chair of the Danish Crime Prevention Council

Tuesday 8th October 2002

10:00 hours: Workshops on good practice concerning:

A: Youth violence/ethnic minorities (2 workshops)

B: Domestic burglary - including its causes within the wider built environment (2 workshops)

C: Robberies motivated by drug addiction - especially in public places like the streets (2 workshops)

Exchanging of views and experiences

Coffee will be offered approximately at 10:45 hours.

12:00 hours: Lunch

13.30 hours: Workshops, continued

Follow-up in the workshops

14:30 hours: Coffee break

15:00 hours: Plenary

Conclusions from the workshops

15:30 hours: Closing of the conference

Summarising and farewell

16:00 hours: End of the conference

Departure after 16:00

European Crime Prevention Network Conference

Conclusions:

Exchange of good practice in crime prevention

Between practitioners in the Member States

On the 7th and 8th October 2002 representatives from Ministries of Justice, Ministries of Interior, Police, Prosecution Services, Courts and practitioners from the EU Member States met at a conference arranged by the Danish Presidency of the European Union. Also representatives from Candidate Countries and EU-institutions were present at the conference.

The subject of the conference was "Exchange of good practice in crime prevention between practitioners in the Member States".

A very good cooperation between the Danish Presidency and the EU Hippokrates programme was essential for the setting up of the conference.

The participants heard a welcome address by the Danish Minister of Justice. The Chairman of the Danish National Crime Prevention Council and the Chairman of the European Crime Prevention Network also welcomed the participants and introduced the programme.

Four highly qualified keynote speakers gave lectures on the following subjects:

- * Professor Flemming Balvig, Denmark: **Stop Smoking! - Stop Crime?**
- * Mrs. Anna Constanza Baldry, Italy: **"School Violence among Italian Youth. From bullying to delinquency. Stepping Stones for developing efficient preventing Strategies"**
- * Mrs. Hille Koskela, Finland: **"Urban Security Politics: Cultures of Tolerance/Cultures of Prejudice"**

- * Mr. Paul Ekblom, United Kingdom: "**Towards a European Knowledge Base in Crime Prevention**"

The four presentations were summarised by Chief of Police, Mr. Lars Rand Jensen, Denmark.

The Danish Presidency

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and in particular Articles 30(1), 31 and 34(2)(c) thereof,

Having regard on the initiative of the French Republic and the Kingdom of Sweden,

Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parliament,

Whereas:

- * The European Parliament adopted a Resolution on 16 December 1993 on small-scale crime in urban areas and its links with organised crime and a Resolution on 17 November 1998 on guidelines and measures for the prevention of organised crime with reference to the establishment of a comprehensive strategy for combating it.
- * Article 29 of the Treaty states that the objective of the Union in this area is to be achieved by preventing and combating crime organised or otherwise.
- * The Vienna Action Plan called for crime prevention measures to be drawn up in the five years following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.
- * The Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999 concluded that there was a need to develop crime prevention measures, to exchange best practices and to strengthen the network of competent national authorities for crime prevention, as well as co-operation between national organisations specialising in this field, specifying that this co-operation could have as its chief priorities juvenile, urban and drug-related crime. To this end, a study of the possibility of a programme financed by the Community was called for.
- * The European Union Strategy for the beginning of the new millennium on the prevention and control of organised crime calls in Recommendation 6 for the

Council to be assisted by suitable qualified experts on crime prevention, such as the national focal point, or by establishing a network of experts from national crime prevention organisation.

- * Several major seminars and conferences on crime prevention, most notably those held in Stockholm in 1996, in Noordwijk in 1997, in London in 1998, in the Algarve in 2000, and at the Sundsvall Conference in 2001 called for the establishment of a network within the European Union to develop co-operation on crime prevention. The High Level Conference in the Algarve also highlighted the need for a multidisciplinary, joint approach to crime prevention. The conference in Zaragoza in 1996 also pointed to this need in highlighting the strong links between organised crime and crime in general.
- * Society as a whole must be involved in the development of a partnership between national, local and regional public authorities, non-governmental organisations, the private sector and citizens. The causes of crime are multiple and must therefore be dealt with by measures at different levels, by different groups in society, in partnership with the players involved who have different powers and experience, including civil society.
- * Since the majority of the crimes of which citizens of the European Union are victims are committed in urban areas, urban policies must also be taken into consideration. In so doing, emphasis should be given to any kind of urban violence that affects the normal functioning of the community.
- * Having regard to the Council Decision of 28th May 2001 setting up a European Crime Prevention Network.
- * Having regard to the first annual working programme of the European Crime Prevention Network

has organised a conference divided into two different parts.

The first part consisting of a plenary session and the second consisting of five workshops. The topics of the workshops were closely related to the three main topics discussed during the conference, namely youth violence/ethnic minorities, domestic burglary and robberies motivated by drug addiction.

Reflections and conclusions from the very valuable discussions in the five workshops are included as annex 1 to this document.

On this background and bearing in mind the presentations during the conference and the discussions in the five workshops the seminar [the Presidency] concludes:

The discussions showed a great degree of agreement that these good practices are valuable examples in contributing to the prevention of crime in European Union. There was agreement that these examples in accordance with the wishes of the Member States deserve to be implemented throughout the Union.

Participants agreed that reviewing, describing, implementing and monitoring good practices in the field of crime prevention, in an increasing number of crime areas, should be a continuous effort of Member States.

Participants agreed that the Aalborg conference represents an essential first step in this process and that these types of conferences should be organised on a regular basis. A follow-up conference should be organised before the end of 2003. Such a conference could examine the status of implementation of the good practices presented in Aalborg and could present a second set of other good practices on subjects decided by the EUCPN.

The European Commission has offered to examine the possibility to co-finance such a conference from the budget of the EU AGIS programme.

The Conference [Presidency] agreed upon the following Recommendations and Points of Action:

Recommendation 1:

EUCPN should set up a mechanism to share technological innovations in crime prevention.

Action: Meetings should be organised to share innovations on specific topics (mobile phone theft, car theft, etc.)

Recommendation 2:

Design to reduce crime should be promoted as a standard by EU Member States

Action: It will be examined with the European Commission if crime-proof design can be promoted through EU funding programmes.

Recommendation 3:

EU Member States should consider giving priority to early intervention to reduce youth offending.

Action: EUCPN should - if possible -develop over the next 12 months a good practice guide on early intervention to prevent youth offending.

Recommendation 4:

EUCPN should promote and develop the use of a knowledge- based approach to crime prevention as also stated in the conclusions of the Sundsvall Conference.

Action: The EUCPN-website should include help to practitioners on a knowledge-based approach.

Recommendation 5:

EUCPN should promote comparative research into crime prevention to develop solutions covering two or more Member States.

Action: It will be examined if the European Commission can give priority to comparative crime prevention research under the new AGIS programme and The SIXth Framework Programme.

Recommendation 6:

EUCPN should review progress of implementing these recommendations.

Action: The incoming Italian Presidency has indicated willingness to organise a conference as a follow-up to the Aalborg conference to review progress.

Stop Smoking! - Stop Crime?¹

By Flemming Balvig,

Professor in Sociology of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen

The Smoker

Let me start out with a warning: What I am going to say will probably be a nightmare for those of you who smoke or who have ever smoked in the presence of or to the knowledge of young people. I am going to give you some part of the responsibility of not only that many people in our societies die too young but also that they commit crime, that they smoke marihuana, that they get hooked on heroin, that they try designer drugs etc. You name it, and I will hold you responsible.

This is not to say that those of you who have never smoked are innocent. If some of you non-smokers have been drinking alcohol in the presence of or to the knowledge of young people it is the same story and same conclusion. The only difference is that today I am going to focus more on smoking than on drinking.

As you can understand, my lecture is about social heritage. When our kids do something good, we are very proud and we make a link directly from their behaviour to our own influence. He has his talent for music from his mother, he is so good at playing football because his father is so good at playing football, my son is a mathematical genius because I am a mathematical genius, my daughter is behaving so polite and friendly because I have taught her so etc. - but when it comes to behaviour like vandalism, burglary, pot-smoking, tobacco-smoking, use of drugs etc. the story is completely different: then it is the media, the school, the society, the politicians, the other peoples kids, the inefficiency of crime prevention structures and so on.

The focus of my lecture will be very general and basic as well in its theme as in its outlook on this theme.

The theme of the lecture will be on risk behaviour among young people, and with this I mean behaviour with a considerable risk of being harmful to themselves and/or to other people. The specific kind of risk behaviour considered will be - as you already

¹ Plenary Speech at the European Crime Prevention Conference, October 7th 2002 in Aalborg, Denmark. The overhead's used, P1-P22, are not included, but will be published seperately.

know by now - tobacco smoking and alcohol drinking, but also many kinds of delinquent behaviour and many kinds of drug use.

The empirical Background for what I will be saying is the so-called Ringsted Project.

The Ringsted project is a large-scale study of the relationship between young people's life-styles and their use of legal and illegal substances such as tobacco, alcohol, marihuana, and ecstasy - and delinquent behaviour. The study includes all persons between the age of 11 and 24 living in Ringsted. The municipality of Ringsted is situated in the middle of the island of Zealand, approximately 60 kilometres from the capital of Copenhagen. It is inhabited by 30.000 people, half of these living in the town of Ringsted. Ringsted has been selected, not because we expected the problems to be especially prominent there, but because the municipality resembles many other Danish municipalities in size and composition; this should ensure that lessons from the study could be useful in other parts of Denmark as well and probably also in other parts of the world outside Denmark.

We have distributed extensive questionnaires to all young people between 11 and 24 years of age; we have conducted extensive participant observation in the town and its bars and discotheques; and we have conducted a large number of interviews with pupils and teachers in schools, patrons and staff/owners in bars, municipal employees, health care professionals, police officers, and other persons of interest. The results of these investigations have been continuously published on our website (www.ringstedprojektet.dk) - and on this website you can also find more information about the project.

The following Features distinguish the Ringsted Project:

- * __A major research effort put into a relatively small geographic area
- * __A focus on all kinds of intoxicating substances, both legal and illegal - and delinquency
- * __A focus on the relation between use of substance and young people's lives in general
- * __A further aim of initiating and evaluating possible preventive measures.

Final Results of the Study will be published in March 2005.

The questions

On the background of some of the preliminary results of this study I am now going to try to highlight three very basic questions concerning risk behaviour:

1) Does there exist an Optimum Age for starting preventive Activities?

When you try to answer this question about the possible existence of a strategic age there are at least two very basic conditions, that you ought to take into consideration but which - never the less - very often are forgotten in practise:

- * Prevention should start before the behaviour you intend to prevent start up if 1 out of 4 in the age of 15 are smoking then the age of 15 is much too late to begin preventing smoking.

AND

- * Prevention is most effective if the dominant attitudes in the groups in which you are going to do the prevention are negative towards the behaviour you want to prevent. It is very difficult to do anything, if the groups' attitudes and their motivation are indifferent to the topic - and almost impossible if the attitudes and motivations are negative.

2) Are any of the different Types of Risk behaviour more important to focus on in these preventive Activities than others?

This is a question about the possible existence of strategic risk behaviour. Also here you have at least two very basic conditions you ought to take into consideration trying to answer this question:

- * You ought to focus on risk behaviour, where the risk of damage is considerable AND where the damage is considerable if it happens. Too many preventive programs focus on behaviour that very few ever will be engaged in and where the damage typically is very small or even non-existent.

AND

- * You ought to focus on risk behaviour that is closely connected with other kind of risk behaviour, directly or indirectly. This means that if you have success in your preventive activities, your effort can be smaller in other, perhaps more difficult areas. - And if you are really successful you can even forget about other kind of closely related forms of behaviour. To raise a somewhat provoking question: Perhaps you can forget about preventing smoking marihuana, if you can successfully prevent smoking tobacco.

3) What kind of Demands should you have on the Measures you apply in your preventive Activities?

The general answer to this is that you have to think about the social context. I think the two main dimensions about the social context for preventing risk behaviour among young people are the following:

- * Young people want to be - and are in their behaviour very much motivated by the drive to be popular in each other's eyes. Peter wants to be popular with Michael, Michael wants to be popular with Peter, George and Susan and so on. That is why the efforts in preventive activities has to be focused in a very concrete and direct way on the behaviour's specific meaning and consequences for specific kids and adolescents and their relationships.

AND

- * Young people want in the lifestyles and behaviour to be older than they are. Kids in the age of 13 want to behave like if they were 14 or 15; kids in the age of 14 want to behave as if they were 15 or 16 and so on. - And if you follow this it all ends up in the adult world. Also in some very general way kids and adolescents want to behave and have the lifestyles of adults. And here we have one of the links to influence their social behaviour. To put it very simply: If you are 40 years old and engaged in preventing young people from starting smoking, perhaps the most effective thing

you could do is to leave the young people alone and concentrate on yourself, i.e. start stopping smoking, start getting the teachers in the local school quitting tobacco, start helping your colleagues at work leaving the tobacco behind them - and so on. Said very simply: If you are in the prevention business concerning young people - and we all are, of course, as adults - you should start thinking more about changing yourself and the other adults close to you than thinking about your kids and young people in general. One of the big obstacles to successful prevention is, in my opinion, our lack of willingness to start out and focus on us. We want to change the world with just one exception: We do not want to change ourselves.

Let us now look at some of the preliminary results from the Ringsted project and see if they can give us some hints concerning answers to these three basic questions.

Risk Behaviour

Some of the forms of risk behaviour we are focusing on in this project - and in this lecture - are dominantly legal - but can be illegal for certain age groups in certain circumstances and in certain countries, that is the use of alcohol and tobacco smoking. Others are dominantly illegal - but can be legal for certain age groups in certain circumstances in certain countries, that is delinquent behaviour, the use of hash and the use of other drugs. All of these forms of behaviour, but especially delinquent behaviour and the use of other kind of drugs than hash consist of a complex of many different forms of behaviour, but typical they will be highly interrelated so it IS meaningful to talk about them as general forms of risk behaviour.

What about the first question then: Does there exist a strategic age? When do we have to start preventing, if we want to start before the risk behaviour has already started?

Age and Alcohol

The first graph here shows you the relationship between age (i.e. school grade - in Denmark you begin in the 1st grade typically when you are 7 years old, some are only 6 and very few 8 - then you can calculate the rest for yourself) and the use of alcohol.

To understand the Graph I have to teach you a little bit of Danish:

Ringstedprojektet means "The Ringsted project" - very easy isn't it?

Class means grade - not that difficult, isn't it?

The figures are exactly the same, of course.

But then the content in the legend:

At the one extreme with the white colour you have:

Aldrig drukket = "Never been drinking alcohol"

And at the other extreme with the black colour you have:

Fuld ugentligt = "Being drunk at least once a week"

And in between you have different degrees of drinking level.

To make it easier for you, the colours are chosen in accordance with stereotypes:

White = never been drinking, Green is ok for most people (tasted alcohol) and so on:

Dark grey: being drunk at least once a month, and then black: being drunk at least once a week.

So: In 5th and 6th grade there is almost nobody who is getting drunk regularly - it starts up in 7th grade and in the 8th and 9th grade a large minority is quite often drunk. Danish youth in general drink more than all other young people in Europe and perhaps in the world.

Age and Smoking

The next one is about the development of smoking:

The white section represent the percentage that have never tasted tobacco, the black colour the percentage that smoke more than 10 cigarettes a day. The red colour represents that percentage of the youth who smoke, but only at parties.

Almost no one is smoking in 5th and 6th grade, although a few ones have tried it. Something begins to happen in 7th grade and in 8th and 9th grade a considerable minority is smoking and the majority have tried smoking.

When it comes to the dominantly illegal types of risk behaviour, I am not going say much about delinquency, because that is what all of you is very familiar with.

Age and Hash

But here is the relationship between the use of hash and the school grade. The picture is exactly the same. Notice the colours, I have chosen. It is no-tolerance or zero-tolerance colours. No green colour, no yellow colour. It is either white or different grades of black.

Age and Drugs

Even more so with use of other drugs: Here it is either white or black: Have they tried it or have they not tried it. Almost nobody in 5th and 6th grade has tried other drugs than hash - but in the 9th grade it is close to 10 percent.

So when it comes to this typical provincial area in a highly developed welfare society like Denmark I think the answer about strategic age is that you have to start at the latest in 6th grade, i.e. when the kids are 12-13 years old.

If I had the time I could qualify this conclusion further by showing that this is also the age where you will be working predominantly in tailwind when it comes to motivations and attitudes. Kids in this age group find it stupid to drink so much, that you get drunk - they think tobacco smoke is disgusting etc. On the other hand I would also be able to show, that you should not start before the 5th grade - and perhaps 6th grade IS the optimum - because when they are younger they are not at all motivated for the topics themselves: they think that alcohol, cigarettes, vandalism, theft, pot and so on are not at all their business or in any way important to them.

The second question, the question about strategic risk behaviour, to focus on, is a lot more complex and challenging.

Just take the question about what is harmful and how harmful different kind of behaviour is. In stead of trying the hopeless - that is a meaningful and thorough discussion of this - I am going just to jump to my own conclusion, and that is:

Smoking

If harmfulness is the criteria for choosing strategic behaviour to focus on in our preventive business, smoking tobacco is a very serious candidate because:

1) If you look at intensive Use considerably more People will engage in this Behaviour than in any of the other Types of Risk Behaviour, we are considering

AND

2) If you look at the Risk of dying - and I will claim that dying has to be considered a harmful Consequence!

- Nothing else is as risky as tobacco smoking.

But if you then focus on smoking, can this then be considered a good strategic choice in relationship to the criteria that changing this behaviour also is an optimum way of changing the other forms of risk behaviour?

The first and obvious way to approach the topic is to investigate if the different forms of risk behaviour are interrelated. Is it so that if you drink a lot, you then compensate by not smoking - or is it more so, that if you drink a lot as young kid you probably also smoke. I am sure it is of no surprise to you that the reality is a lot more close to the last mentioned possibility than to the first. The different kinds of risk behaviour are closely interrelated (which I stress is not the same as saying that they are causally related to each other).

Smoking and Drinking

Here is the relationship between smoking and drinking

Smoking and Hash

And between smoking and the use of hash - no one is trying hash that is not a smoker!

Smoking and other Drugs

And here between smoking and the use of other drugs than hash - drugs are not an issue at all among young people who do not smoke!

Smoking and Crime

And crime: Because of this strong correlation my suggestion will be, that the police go out and arrest everyone beneath the age of 15, they see with a cigarette in their mouth - they are all delinquent!

Let me finish trying answering the question about the strategic choice of risk behaviour by showing you the result of analyses, which try to illuminate, which of the five different kind of risk behaviour is most closely connected to each other. That is: IF the relationships are at least partly causal - directly or indirectly - which one should we try change to get the maximum output in form of reducing risk behaviour as such?

Relations between different Forms of Risk Behaviour

The method used is a combination of logistic regression analysis and factor analyses. The output is a figure between minus 1 and plus 1 showing the averages degree of correlation's with the other types of behaviour. Even small differences in the size of the numbers may mean rather big differences in their degree of interrelationships.

The analysis is showing that they all are very highly interrelated - and that the kind of risk behaviour most highly interrelated with other forms of behaviour is tobacco smoking.

So to conclude on the second question, I suggest that tobacco smoking is a strategically well motivated choice. It is an ironic thought that, until now, smoking is the kind of risk behaviour that has received the least attention in most of the preventing programs focusing on risk behaviour we ever have accomplished in all the countries represented here today.

But then we end up with the most difficult of the three questions: What to do? Ok, we focus on tobacco smoking among kids 12-13 years old. But what are we going to do with them, towards them, or around them?

We do know of a lot of measures that do not work. Generally, we use most of our resources on projects that are not working and if they are working it is quite often in the wrong direction. What we are doing most is making campaigns, making it an agenda in the school, making brochures and so on. If such campaigns work at all, they do in fact often stimulate smoking, drinking, use of marihuana and so on - they do not prevent it!

I think one of the main reasons that all these efforts are wasted efforts or even counter-productive efforts is that they do not take the social context in consideration or do not do this in the right way.

Young people smoke because their parents, their schoolteachers, their police officers, their club leaders and so on smoke AND because they think it gives them status among

those in the same age as themselves and - especially among those who are 1 or 2 years older.

In these years where we have talked so much about the diminishing influence of the family, the uselessness of parents as role models, the liberations projects, the young people choosing their own life and lifestyle, and so on, I think we have underestimated and too much neglected the still very strong relationship between young peoples lifestyle and the lifestyle of their parents, teachers and so on.

When it comes to tobacco smoking there is a strong relationship between parents' smoking and kids' smoking:

Smoking and non-smoking Families I

In the Ringsted project we compared smoking among kids from families where no adults were smoking with smoking among kids from families where all adults were smoking:

In the non-smoking families, 26% of the kids have tried smoking, but 58% in the all-smoking families.

And of those kids, who had tried to smoke, 64% in the non-smoking families had done it several times in contrast to almost everyone in the all-smoking families (91%).

Of those who had tried to smoke several times, 50% of the kids in the non-smoking families do smoke regularly at parties. In the all-smoking families it is 63%.

Of those who smoke at parties, 40% of the kids in the non-smoking families do also smoke daily. In the all-smoking families it is two out of three, 68%.

Of those who smoke each day, 65% of the kids in the non-smoking families do smoke more 6 or more cigarettes a day. It is 86% of the kids in the all-smoking families.

Finally, and that is the only exception in the whole process from non-smoker to heavy smoker: The risk of smoking 11 or more cigarettes a day for those already smoking 6 or more a day do not differ between kids from non-smoking and all-smoking families. Probably the effect of nicotine - the dependence created by the drug nicotine - is in this late phase in the process more important than social heritage.

Smoking and non-smoking Families II

If we go back to the first phase in the process - the non-smoking phase - and try to look after links between parent's behaviour and kid's behaviour these links are also very strong:

Only 7% of the non-smoking kids from the non-smoking families think they will ever start smoking. In the all-smoking families it is more than 1 out of 4, 29%.

And the kids from the non-smoking families who anyway do smoke do feel worse about their smoking than smoking kids from all-smoking families: They more often regret that they started smoking, they are more often convinced that they will stop smoking, they are more often trying to hide their smoking from their parents.

And as you can see, the smoking kids in the non-smoking families more often do meet resistance to their smoking than the kids in the all-smoking families. Almost 1 out of 5 - 18% - are arguing with their parents about the smoking habit, against only 1 out of 20 of the kids in the all-smoking families.

The link between parent's behaviour and kid's behaviour in these areas is not only about the habit but also about the meaning of the habit. Generally kids from non-smoking families do have a rather negative image of smokers. They consider smokers as stupid, lazy, not smart and so on. Kids from smoking families do have a rather positive image of smokers: smart, adult, action-oriented, outgoing etc.

Smoking in 9th Grade I

In the municipality of Ringsted we have 14 school classes at the 9th grade with more than 10 pupils. Here are the figures for each of those 14 classes according to how many who do smoke each day and/or at parties. The differences are rather big. We do have one class, where nobody is smoking at all and at the other end we have a class where almost 2 out of 3 - 64% - are smoking - quite a few considering that we are talking about young people about the age of 15.

My first idea about this was that there must be a lot of unpredictable factors in play here. In one class the popular pupil is a smoker, in another class he or she is a non-smoker - in one class they have had parties together with older pupils and that explain their higher frequency of smoking and so on.

So I must admit we were quite surprised when we tried to compare the level of smoking among the kids in the different classes with the level of smoking among the parents of the kids. Here it is:

Smoking in 9th Grade II

In the vertical axe you have the percentage of pupils smoking tobacco in a class and on the horizontal axe you have an index for smoking among the adults members in the family, including adult siblings.

The class where nobody is smoking is also the class where the fewest of the fathers, mothers and grown up siblings are smoking - and the class where the most are smoking is the class where the most of the fathers, mothers and grown up siblings are smoking.

The relationship is quite strong. It is not at all so difficult to predict the level of smoking in a school class, if you know what the adults in their families are doing.

When we do crime prevention we often say that we should include the families in the programs, for example inform the parents, and have discussions with the parents and so on. But I think these results should get us to move a little further and say: We should not only include the parents - we should change the parents - and perhaps do that before anything else. And if we are the persons that are trying to change the parents and we do have some kind of authority in relation to these parents, we should start with changing ourselves to hope of any impact of what we are doing.

Of course, this is not in any way the whole story - just an important part of the story that we do not take seriously enough.

Thus the link between peers behaviour in these areas is also strong:

P17A

What this graph is showing is that young people, who have friends that do not smoke, generally do not smoke themselves - and young people who have friends that smoke generally do smoke themselves.

The study also shows - and this has been a bit contrary to our expectations - that smoking is connected to the perception of popularity. Kids who smoke see themselves more often to be one of the most popular pupils in their class than kids who do not smoke. Kids who smoke receive more text messages on their mobile phones from other young people than kids who do not smoke do; at least up to a certain point. The most popular are those smoking at parties and those smoking a few cigarettes a day. The popularity of those smoking a pack a day is lower. There is probably a message in this: You should smoke, but you should also have control over yourself and your life, and this is not the case if the nicotine is controlling you as it is if you smoke a pack a day.

Kids who smoke have more often friends that are a little older than themselves than kids who do not smoke. This shows the connection between popularity and behaving like an adult - and shows the link to what is going on in the adult world.

Pluralistic Ignorance

One very important factor in this picture is the existence of pluralistic ignorance: The young people often have very distorted images of each other - and especially of those older than themselves and among them those who are older and live in bigger cities. For kids living in Ringsted, the big city is Copenhagen, the capital of Denmark - that is where the real life is, that is where they all want to go and that is where the people live they admire.

In the age of 11-13 years, that is among pupils in 5th to 6th grades, almost - as we have seen - nobody is smoking daily. It is less than 1/2%.

They also know that their friends do not smoke either. Only 1% does think that 50% or more of their friends are smoking tobacco.

However, their image of those at the same age in Ringsted in general is somewhat different. 1 out of 6 - 16% - do think that half or more of those in the same age as they in Ringsted do smoke every day.

And more than 1 out of 3, 35%, think that - in the big city - in the centre of their image of the world - in Copenhagen - half or more of those in the same age as themselves, that is other 11-13 years old kids, do smoke.

In fact we do know from surveys that there are no more smokers among these young kids in Copenhagen than in the provincial town Ringsted. It is less than 1/2%.

43% of the 11-13 year old kids do think that half or more of those in Ringsted who are in the age of 15 or 16 are smoking daily. In reality it is only 22% of the 15-16 year old, who are smoking.

And on the top of the list in their imagination we have those they probably admire the most, the 15-16 year old people in Copenhagen. Almost 1 out of 2 does think that half or more of the 15-16 year old people in Copenhagen are smoking. In reality it is probably a little less than among 15-16 years old in Ringsted, about 20%.

To give you an idea how you could and should take these things into consideration let me tell you about a little experiment that was carried out in Copenhagen 33 years

ago, i.e. in 1969, among pupils in their 9th grade. At that time the use of hash and marihuana was the big issue among and with young people.

Compared to smoking tobacco and what I have been saying about this you could not talk about a direct link between the young peoples smoking of marihuana and their parent's habits in this area, because very, very few of their parents had had any experience with this new drug in 1969.

The similarity however was the existence of pluralistic ignorance:

The Hash Experiment I

9% has tried to smoke hash, but when we asked them about if they thought their best friend had tried to smoke hash, the estimate was 18%.

Asked about how many in their class, they thought had smoked hash the estimate was even more distorted - 35%, or 1 out of 3 was the estimate.

Asked about a larger group, all in the same age in their school, the estimate was that 52% had tried hash.

Asked about all in the same age as themselves in the whole country, the estimate was 78%, which should be looked at in the perspective that only 4-5% of the 15 years old school kids in the whole country had actually tried smoking hash in 1969.

And when we asked about those a little older than themselves their estimate was that almost everyone had been smoking hash.

So the situation was probably that a lot of kids tried smoking hash because they thought all others have tried and that this behaviour was necessary to be accepted among peers and among those a little older than themselves.

On the background of these data and this simple theory we then made an experiment, where we divided the 9 school classes randomly in 3 groups.

The Hash Experiment II

The first group functioned as a control group. We did not do anything with these classes, besides making a follow-up study on their use of hash.

The second group was an experimental group. We spent a school day with these classes doing the following:

1. We presented the specific data for them for their own class.
2. We let them have a group work, where the topic was: Why do we have these misunderstandings about each other and about other young people.
3. We then had a plenum trying to list all the causes for the pluralistic misunderstandings, and in the lunch break we made a copy of this list for each pupil.
4. After lunch we had a new group work in new groups where the topic was how they could diminish the risk of pluralistic ignorance, trying to be as concrete and specific as possible.
5. We then had a new plenum trying to make up a list of suggestions about what to do.
6. In the coffee break we made a copy of this list for each pupil.
7. After the coffee break we had the third sequence of group work in new groups where we asked them to make some decisions for the class and for the school about how to avoid pluralistic ignorance.
8. We then had a plenum about this.
9. And we then let the groups go together in their classes and asked the classes, on the background of the group work, to make some final decisions.
10. And we finished the day with a plenum where the three classes told about their decisions - and where decisions for the school as such were discussed.
11. The next day the decisions were published. Everyone got a copy. A copy was put in the classroom and, it was published in the school paper and so on. All the parents got a copy too.
12. A follow-up discussion was made in the classes one week later, again a month later and finally 3-month later.

The third group was also an experimental group. We did exactly the same in these three classes, but used two days - and it was the second day that was identical with the other experimental groups. On the first day we confronted pupils who had a wrong impression of each other, information that was covered by a kind of sociometry in a supplemental questionnaire. If Peter thought that Michael had tried to smoke hash, but Michael said he had never tried it, we asked Peter and Michael to go in private for a quarter of an hour and discuss how this misunderstanding could have happened.

The point is that in this experimental group all the pupils got a very personal and very specific background for the discussions next day.

We made a follow-up study one and a half-year later asking the young people if they had smoked hash within the last month.

The Hash Experiment III

In the control group there was an increase, which was pretty much in accordance with what was generally going on in the Danish society around 1970 and with young people becoming 1 1/2 year older.

Despite the general trend in the society and with age there was no increase in the use of hash in the experimental groups, where they had had the group works and plenums.

And in the experimental groups, where they also had personal confrontations, there was a decrease in the number of youth smoking hash.

The trend was rather homogenous and was in the same directions for each of the 3 classes in each of the three groups.

And what is most interesting: No focus had been on other drugs than hash; no focus had been on smoking; no focus had been on alcohol; no focus had been on delinquency. But in each of these areas we found exactly the same trend. In the experimental groups with the personal confrontation there was a drop in the use of other drugs, a drop in delinquency, a drop in the use of alcohol and the amount of alcohol used at every occasion - and a drop in tobacco smoking. I think the explanation of this is, that you had succeeded in more generally changing the relationships among the young people and their knowledge of and expectations to each other.

Just a simple example: there existed something-called Monday-bragging. Each Monday morning when the pupils showed up in school they told each other stories. Stories about how many beers they had been drinking, how many boys and girls they had been to bed with, how much hash they had been smoking etc. For kids who knew each other very well this was a game. The one knows that the other is lying and exaggerating, but the deal is that because I do not reveal him he is not going to reveal me. The problem is all those around them, that are not friends and who has no direct knowledge of what they have been doing in the weekend. They get an over dramatised image of what is going on.

In the experimental groups with direct confrontation this Monday-bragging stopped immediately. In fact, now the others would stop you, by laughing at you if you tried to tell stories - and it became ok to tell, that you have had a boring weekend together with your family, been doing your homework, taking part in the cleaning of the house and so on. The norms for communications and what you were allowed to communicate and exchange of information had changed from one day to the other. No brochure or teaching program about the dangers of smoking hash could ever have accomplished such a change - I think.

So it is time for me for summing up:

Summing up

I have focused on risk behaviour in general and have posed three basic questions:

1. Does there exist a strategic age for preventive activities. The answer I suggest is yes - 12-13 years, at least in March 2002 in the geographical area I have investigated. It can change of course and it can be different in other places. You have to make your own surveys to find out.
2. Does there exist a strategic risk behaviour your preventive activities could be focused on. My answer to this is also yes - and the answer I suggest is tobacco smoking.
3. Does there exist any demands on the interventions you are going to do to prevent smoking among 12-13 years youngsters for these interventions to be effective. I suggest that the answer is you have to work with or on the social context of which there are two of special importance: You have to include the authorities - especially the parents but also the school teachers, the police, yourself - around the youngsters not just as partners but also as focus for your preventive activities. And you have to involve the young people in direct confrontation and discussions about their own behaviour in a very concrete way and not just depend on campaigns or traditional teachings methods.

It is not in any way my point or the conclusion, that you can get rid of all kind of risk behaviour among young people following these strategies. My point or conclusion is much more modest: I think it is worth it to give such strategies a try and my assumption is that they CAN make a measurable difference.

School Violence among Italian Youth. From Bullying to Delinquency: Stepping Stones for developing Efficient preventing Strategies

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What is School Violence

School violence can be defined as **any act perpetuated against people (adults or peers) or objects in the school setting using force and aggression. In Italy, compared to the US, the level of school violence is lower and with reduced dramatic effects: this does not mean that the problem does not exist, but it is enough to say that guns are illegal and the level of youth delinquency is lower. Metal detectors are not in use but it is not uncommon to read in the papers about episodes of violence committed.**

In Italy, the criminal age for juveniles is 14: under this age a juvenile can not be prosecuted by the Juvenile Court. If someone aged under 14 commits a crime, he/she is referred to the social services for vigilance and in case of need support to the family, but no criminal file is opened.

School violence can take many forms: the use of the word 'violence' make us think of acts of destruction, aggression; bullying per se can be identified as part of school violence even if not all of it consists of violence acts.

Bullying is a complex phenomenon; several factors need to be taken into account to explain its nature, onset, development and persistency. Bullying is a systematic set of behaviours directed to INFLICT pain towards another person. It involves direct or indirect actions committed by a more powerful person or group of persons towards another person- perceived - as weaker (Farrington, 1993). Unresolved or unsolved conflicts may escalate in more severe forms of violence. The daily hassle builds up tension in a conflict that might explode in violent act is not handled properly.

BULLYING IN SCHOOL is a serious problem affecting between 7% and 35% of children and adolescents in Europe, United States, Canada, Australia and Japan (Smith, Morita, Junger-Tas, Olweus, Catalano, & Slee, 1999).

In Italy the prevalence rates are similar with those from other European countries, indicating that on average 25-35% of all students in the elementary and middle schools are involved in bullying as victims, bullies or both. Bullying per se is not a criminal act; however it has devastating effects on those involved and there is evidence that juvenile delinquents were more often involved in bullying compared to non delinquents.

Causes of bullying are multiple and are related to the individual but also to the socio-family context. Parents, in this regard, seem to play a central role and bullying can be explained at least in part as an indicator of family related problems especially violence (Farrington, 1993, Steinberg, 2000).

There is now clear evidence of the relationship between family violence and the development of aggressive and antisocial behavior in children living in these families (Widom, 1989). Bowers, Smith and Binney (1994) reported that in England children who bully or are victimized at school have parents who tend to be violent to each other and also to their children; cohesive families are those found least likely to report disruptive behaviors among children (Farrington, 1991).

Children exposed to domestic violence are at higher risk of developing short and long term (negative) consequences, compared to those who are not exposed (Kolbo, Blakely & Engleman, 1996; Herrera & McCloskey, 2001). At school they tend to be more aggressive or even commit delinquent acts or else they are at risk of becoming victims of further abuse at school. Sternberg et al. (1993) found that abused children and those who were abused and exposed to family violence were more likely than children in the control group (non abused nor exposed) to exhibit externalizing behavior such as aggression towards peers (see also the review by Edleson, 1999). Girls show more internalized problems such as depression and anxiety (O'Keefe, 1994, 1995), are less likely to develop conduct disorders reported more frequently by boys but they might become more submissive and possible targets of bullying at school (Kerig, 1999; Widom, 2000). A significant strong association between maladjustment and exposure to domestic violence was found with the Canadian National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth (Dauvergne & Johnson, 2001), that showed that according to the mothers' accounts, children witnessing domestic violence were nearly three times as likely to be involved in physical aggression at school (fighting, bullying or threatening others) compared to those who did not witness violence (28.1% vs. 11.3%) and over twice as likely to be involved in indirect aggression (non-physical forms of aggression

such as rallying friends against someone, spreading gossip, excluding someone from a group, or setting up another child for punishment).

According to the review conducted by Widom (1989, 2000) on the cycle of violence, up to 70% of violent adults had a history of child abuse, either as direct victims or as witnesses of interparental violence. Retrospective studies with samples of adult offenders indicated that around 30% of them had been living in violent families; prospective studies show that 15% of children, who witnessed violence or were directly abused by the age of 8, became delinquent at 18 and 32 years.

Wilczenski et al. (1997) claims that being directly or indirectly victimized at home brings the child to 'learn' this behavior and signal to others that weakness has been learned and accepted as a stable personal trait. This explanation is in line with the 'social learning theory' of Bandura (1973) according to youngsters, who witness their mothers being harassed, insulted and beaten up by their partner, might be unable to develop social and assertive skills to socialize and defend from any bullying they might be at risk of, and this is especially true for girls.

Being a bully at school increases the risk of conducting also other antisocial behaviors, such as deviant behaviors. In fact, boys who bully have a significant tendency to be also official and self-reported delinquents (Farrington, 1992). In the Swedish research by Olweus (1994), bullies were four times more likely than non-bullies to become recidivist delinquents. The overlap between bullies and delinquents has also been reported in other countries (Hamalainen and Pulkkinen, 1995; Rigby and Cox, 1996). Bullying and delinquency may overlap because they are both indicators of the same underlying theoretical construct (e.g. an antisocial personality). Alternatively, bullying may be an earlier stage on a developmental sequence leading to delinquency. Alternatively, bullying and delinquency may be indicators of different underlying theoretical constructs.

According to Loeber and Hay (1997), the early manifestation of aggression is related to the later manifestation of violence. Bullying might progress to more serious forms of physical attack and eventually leads to serious violence. According to Farrington (1997) and Le Blanc and Loeber (1993) most adult violent offenders had an antecedent pattern of aggressiveness early in life, which often included bullying. A substantial

proportion of aggressive youths, however, desist over time; the relation between aggression and violent offending at a later age depends on several factors that can be identified as precursors (Farrington, 1991; Loeber and Hay, 1997). For example, different parental practices, such as harsh punishment, are precursors of violent offending. Some parental styles, such as having supportive and authoritative parents, are instead protective factors (Baldry and Farrington, 1998).

A survey conducted by Kidscape (1994), based on a sample of 79 young offenders, revealed that all of them had been involved in bullying in some way. The majority (85%) were themselves bullies or involved as bystanders, either encouraging the bullying or joining in from the sidelines.

It is often unchecked bullying that leads to crime (Kidscape, 1994). Students learn that using violence to get what they want is successful and effective; bullying at school is often undetected and this enables bullies to commit more serious and disruptive behaviours, even leading to crime (Farrington, 1993).

The study conducted by Baldry and Farrington (2000) revealed that bullying and delinquency are highly correlated: almost half of all bullies (48.2%) were also delinquents, and 36.5% of all delinquents were also bullies. They authors suggest that students involved in bullying are at high risk of becoming involved also in more serious misconduct while still at school, and not only in the longer run, especially in the case of boys. Bullying and delinquency, rather than being associated with personal characteristics seem correlated with parental styles.

The strategy adopted to investigate the relationship between bullies and delinquents is to identify students who are both bullies and delinquents, students who are only bullies (not delinquents), students who are only delinquents (not bullies) and students who are neither. To the extent that bullying and delinquency reflect the same underlying construct, the characteristics of only bullies should be similar to the characteristics of only delinquents. To the extent that bullying and delinquency reflect different underlying constructs, the characteristics of only bullies should be different from the characteristics of only delinquents. To the extent that changes with age are seen, conclusions about developmental sequences might be drawn.

Poor family functioning and especially domestic violence might promote bullying in several ways (Rigby, 1996). Parents might show very little care for their children and not consider their feelings. As a consequence, children might develop a low empathy

towards others and express their anger and aggression by intimidating weaker creatures. Badly functioning families might be characterized by a clear imbalance of power and aggression between members; children start to learn to dominate others and might even be encouraged in doing so (Baldry & Farrington, 1998).

Domestic violence in this regard is relevant in explaining aggressive behavior among children. Research on bullying in this area has usually looked at the relationship between different parental rearing practices and the child's aggression at school (Smith & Myron-Wilson, 1998).

Ideally longitudinal studies are needed to determine any causal effects of family factors on the onset of antisocial behavior. Next to the so-called risk factors, protective factors can also play a central role. We refer here to the so-called 'resiliency' meaning the capacity of a child to 'resist' to the negative impact and influence of the negative factors related to the family and or the environment. Resilience is considered as "the process of, capacity for, or outcome of successful adaptation despite challenging or threatening circumstances" (Masten, Best and Garmezy, 1990). Children's resilience capacities refer to their positive coping strategies in facing stressful events (Howard, Dryden and Johnson, 1999); resilience refers to the way adolescents handle stressful day-to-day hassles but also more difficult circumstances; according to the coping strategies students adopt in the face of these stressful events, they might be more or less at risk of bullying others or being victimized and of suffering negative consequences from victimization (Ludwig and Pittman, 1999).

Intervention strategies, in this respect should not only focus in reducing the negative consequences of risk factors, because some of them are beyond the control of the school environment, but rather they should focus in helping young people to build up good coping skills and resiliency.

The Research

We will now present some of the most relevant data derived from a study conducted with a sample of almost 1400 students from elementary, middle and junior high schools in Italy.

Students were contacted in their own classes and after permission obtained from their parents, they had to fill in a self-reported questionnaire measuring bullying,

exposure to violence, delinquency direct victimization at home. Gender comparisons for different types of bullying and victimization at school are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Percentages for types of bullying overall and according to gender differences.

<i>Types of bullying</i>	All students (N=1,026)	Girls (N=498)	Boys (N=528)	$\chi^2 (1)$
'I called someone nasty names'	29.1	20.1	37.7	34.80***
'I did not talk to someone on purpose'	23.5	23.9	23.1	.09
'I physically hurt, e.g. hit and kicked'	15.6	6.4	24.2	61.82***
'I spread rumors about someone'	9.9	5.0	14.6	26.18***
'I threatened'	5.8	2.2	9.1	22.32***
'I stole or ruined belongings'	3.9	1.6	6.1	13.68***
Direct bullying	37.1	23.3	50.0	77.99***
Indirect bullying	28.8	26.3	31.3	3.05
<i>Types of victimization</i>				
'I was called nasty names'	36.5	31.8	40.8	9.04**
'I had rumors spread about me'	23.4	21.7	25.0	1.57
'No one would stay with me at recess time'	19.5	18.3	20.3	.30
'I had my belongings taken away'	15.7	15.3	16.1	.13
'I was physically hurt (hit, kicked)'	14.6	11.6	17.4	6.79**
'No one would talk to me'	12.1	14.3	10.0	4.34*
'I was threatened'	8.5	5.2	11.6	13.24**
Direct victimization	47.5	40.4	54.1	19.07***
Indirect victimization	37.4	35.5	39.2	1.47

*Notes. Comparisons are for boys and girls. 'Direct bullying' includes calling nasty names, physically hurting, taking belongings away, and threatening. 'Indirect bullying' includes spreading rumors, not talking to someone on purpose. 'Direct victimization' includes called nasty names, physically hurt, belongings taken away, threatened. 'Indirect victimization' includes being rejected, rumors spread, no one would talk. Percentages exceed one hundred because students could check more than one type of bullying or victimization. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$*

Results show a significant proportion of students involved in bullying either as bullies or victims. There are a higher proportion of students admitting being victimized compared to those admitting bullying others. The most reported type of bullying is verbal insult, such as 'calling someone nasty names' more often reported by boys than girls but equally high. Overall, boys compared to girls report more often all types of bullying: boys and girls equally report indirect bullying and victimization. Girls compared to boys more often report indirect types of victimization such as 'no one would talk to me'.

The next set of data refers to the comparison between types of bullying and delinquency searched through a study conducted with middle school students who were asked about both their involvement in bullying and delinquency (Table 2). The

study looked at the concurrent involvement in both types of antisocial behaviours: bullying and delinquency to investigate if and which type of bullying is more likely to be related to self-reported delinquency, whether types of delinquency is correlated with different types of bullying. This help us understand if there is a similar underlying pattern between all kinds of antisocial behaviour whether they are expressed as more mild forms and take form of bullying or else can be identifies as deviant act. We have to keep in mind, however, that sometimes bullying and deviant behaviours are very similar in their manifestations and when self-reported by students they can actually refer to the same episodes. The difference lies in behaviours committed within or outside the school. Bullying was referred only to the school setting, whereas delinquency was referred to actions committed outside the school.

Table 2. Relationship between bullying and delinquency in a sample of middle school youngsters.

<i>Delinquency</i>		<i>Types of bullying</i>				
		<i>Threat</i>	<i>Insulted</i>	<i>Physical</i>	<i>Excluded</i>	<i>Spread rumors</i>
<i>Theft</i>	No	6.0 (15)	37.2 (93)	12.4 (31)	24.8 (62)	5.6 (14)
	Yes	16.8 (69)	58.9 (242)	28.0 (115)	28.7 (118)	8.8 (36)
	<i>OR</i>	3.2*	2.4*	2.7*	1.2	1.6
<i>Violence</i>	No	2.8 (7)	37.8 (96)	10.6 (27)	18.1 (46)	5.1 (13)
	Yes	18.4 (78)	58.0 (246)	28.3 (120)	32.8 (139)	9.2 (39)
	<i>OR</i>	7.9**	2.3*	3.3**	2.2*	1.9
<i>Vandalism</i>	No	3.8 (11)	36.6 (106)	9.7 (28)	22.8 (66)	4.5 (13)
	Yes	19.1 (74)	60.6 (235)	30.7 (119)	30.7 (119)	10.1 (39)
	<i>OR</i>	6.0**	2.7*	4.1**	1.5*	2.4*
<i>Substance abuse</i>	No	6.2 (5)	34.6 (28)	13.6 (11)	21.0 (17)	2.5 (2)
	Yes	13.4 (80)	52.5 (314)	22.7 (136)	28.1 (168)	8.4 (50)
	<i>OR</i>	2.3	2.9*	1.8	1.4	3.6
<i>Status crimes</i>	No	2.3 (1)	25.0 (11)	11.4 (5)	9.1 (4)	6.8 (3)
	Yes	13.2 (84)	52.1 (331)	22.4 (142)	28.5 (181)	7.7 (49)
	<i>OR</i>	6.5*	3.3*	2.2	4.0*	1.1

Note: OR = Odds Ratio; * p < .01, ** p < .001

Results indicate an overall overlap between different types of bullying and delinquency especially with regard to violent crimes (e.g. fighting) and most types of bullying (especially threaten, verbal abuse and physical bullying).

Results also show that students who bully are more at risk of committing property or violent offences. Longitudinal studies on the development of delinquent careers are consistent in indicating that bullying in school is a significant predictor of future violence or even delinquency (Farrington, 1993, 1994, and 2000). Clearly not all bullies desist and they will give up their harassing and violent way of relating to others; lack of resilient factors, however, might put them at a higher risk.

Gender differences were then searched for to find out whether boys are more involved in deviant behaviours compared to girls as indicated in most studies on juvenile delinquency. Table 3 shows that for all types of reported deviant behaviours boys are more likely to be involved compared to girls, especially in relation to violent crimes such as carrying a weapon, entering in houses without permission and fighting and based

Table 3. Types of self-reported delinquency according to gender differences.

<i>Self-reported delinquency</i>	Prevalence (%)		
	<i>Girls</i>	<i>Boys</i>	$\chi^2 (1)$
<i>Getting into someone's else house without permission</i>	1.8	16.0	14.32***
<i>Stealing from shops</i>	8.8	30.4	17.12***
<i>Stealing things out of cars</i>	5.3	20.2	11.47***
<i>Stealing from friends' houses</i>	3.5	20.8	16.05***
<i>Taking money from home with no intention of returning it</i>	21.4	34.7	5.08*
<i>Deliberately travelling on bus/tube without a ticket</i>	48.7	62.9	4.86*
<i>Taking a bicycle or scooter without permission</i>	8.0	22.4	9.42**
<i>Driving a car, a motor bike or scooter</i>	26.5	51.2	15.09***
<i>Riding a bicycle without lights</i>	26.5	56.0	21.13***
<i>Annoying, insulting, fighting unknown people in the streets</i>	22.1	41.6	10.29**
<i>Carrying weapon (knife) in case needed in a fight</i>	1.8	24.8	26.36****
<i>Smashing, damaging things in public places, streets, cinema, bus.</i>	12.4	39.2	21.92****
<i>Breaking windows of houses or shops</i>	3.6	21.8	17.09***
<i>Deliberately littering streets by smashing bottles, spitting</i>	39.8	57.3	7.19**
<i>Playing truant from school</i>	7.1	16.8	5.24*
<i>Watching 'X' films under 14</i>	34.5	56.5	11.45***
<i>Watching 'X' films under 18</i>	53.6	72.0	8.63**
<i>Playing gambling games</i>	83.2	95.2	9.11**
<i>Drinking alcohol</i>	30.4	43.4	4.28*
<i>Smoking cigarettes</i>	18.6	30.4	4.44*
<i>Smoking drugs</i>	.9	7.2	5.88**

* P < .05; ** p< .01, *** p< .001.

Good practices. What works what doesn't in the prevention of violence
If we were to adopt a model for the prevention and the reduction of crime,
delinquency or as in the findings presented, regarding school violence and bullying,
we can start form the assessment of those programs that in the short and long term
proved to be the most effective.

Unfortunately not all programs implemented are tested for their efficacy: we find ourselves with a burst of programs often implemented in schools or in the community that have not scientifically proved to be effective, meaning reducing violence. We are here facing problems related to cost-effect evaluation. How much 10 Euro spent to day will enable to save 100 Euro in 10 years time?

Longitudinal studies are the only ones that help addressing these questions. Cross sectional studies and experimental ones, however, are good methods to understand correlation's between different factors to understand the relation between possible risk and protective factors in the development of crime.

When implementing a project for good practice, several variables should be taken into consideration.

According to the 5I's model applied to bullying preventive programs.

With regard to:

- * **Intelligence** - information need to be gathered and analysed on bullying and its consequences, and diagnosing their causes and 'risk and protective factors' associated with such behaviour. Research in this field has helped us so far to understand that bullying is a complex phenomenon related to both individual as well as socio-cultural variable (family back ground, believes and attitude)
- * **Intervention** - considering the range of possible interventions that could be implemented mainly in the school setting but that have a so called 'whole school approach' meaning addressing the problems for students, teachers, parents, other adults. Programs focusing on enhancing the youth's social skills (empathy, perspective taking skills, anger management) as well as working on the social dimension of the group and its role: peer pressure, need of affiliation, parenting practices.
- * **Implementation** - once you decide where to address the intervention, any project need to be approved by the head of the school. It is essential that the program be shared with all members of the school, taking into accounts the need of THAT school, according to the students' needs and the social and environmental contexts.
- * **Insertion** - the program should be brought about organisation or bodies with specific expertise in the field. Teachers can play an essential role: they can be trained and then bring about the program in school. Involvement of police officers

can be effective in giving students the opportunity to share their thoughts about youth crime and implication of it from a criminal point of view.

- * **Impact**, cost-effectiveness and process evaluation - programs should be evaluated for their efficacy. To do this a clear research project should be implemented. Collaboration with research bodies (i.e. University is essential) to share expertise. Pre and post test assessment, control and experimental groups and follow-ups should all be included to provide a clear frame of reference to learn about the impact of a program.

Conclusions

School policies are not always consistent in providing effective responses to tackle and address the problem of bullying and violence, nor delinquency. Locally based projects, however, have shown effective results in reducing bullying and prevent the onset of any delinquent behaviour.

Alternative strategies to address violence in school can focus on various aspects of the problem specially referring to preventive measures. There is no a perfect way to tackle the problem. However, most effective programs have shown to be strategic when they address and involve the whole school and when they have a clear 'whole school policy'. One of the most relevant ways to handle conflicts is through mediation, which might help prevent some types of violence among peers. Teaching youngsters to solve their conflicts in a constructive rather than in a destructive way has shown to have a positive impact in reducing in the short and in the long run these problems (Cohen, 1995).

Intervention projects in schools should be based on a whole-school approach involving also parents, teaching them how to educate their children and develop communicative skills without giving: being authoritative rather than authoritarian (Baumrind, 1996). In addition, more intervention strategies should be addressed to prevention programmes that address parenting from the very early stage of their rearing practice, teaching mediating and problem solving techniques. Violence and aggressive might lead to further violence (Widom, 1989), it is essential therefore to stop this cycle at its early onset.

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Urban Security Policies: 'Cultures of Tolerance' versus 'Cultures of Prejudice'

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In urban planning, crime prevention is often treated as a practical question. Solutions focus on a particular, restricted area and the political implications of each solution are ignored. In this paper my aim is to provide reasoning, which enables us to make a comparison between two different 'crime prevention policies' which I have called: the cultures of tolerance and the cultures of prejudice. It is clear that these two are ideal types, rather than actual strategies. My point is that the crime prevention practices we choose should be in harmony with the values we have. In seeking for practical solutions, this principle sometimes becomes fuzzy. I will use some examples - mainly from Helsinki, some from elsewhere Finland - but I will do this in order to clarify the conceptual points I make, rather than in order to evaluate the concrete projects. The discussion about empirical examples of good practise takes place in the workshops of this conference. My aim is to provide a framework for those discussions. To present a so-called conceptual mirror.

To highlight this, I use a concept urban security policy. Traditionally 'security policy' has been connected to a nation's foreign issues and its defence policy. It has been almost a military term. However, this concept can be fruitful as it is used in another context. It can be claimed that there are also 'internal' security policies: a national security policy for each country, and a local security policy for each city or community. At urban level, city planners and architects are not the only ones producing this. Also the personnel of the security field take part in it: the police and the private security guards. It can also be claimed that the residents of each particular area take part. The degree of this depends

on how democratic the planning processes are. However, local democracy does not make the practices less political. Every crime prevention practice has a political basis.

'Cultures of Tolerance' versus 'Cultures of Prejudice'

The subject of urban planning as a means for increasing security is itself controversial in many ways. It can be questioned whether the feeling of safety on the whole can be influenced by urban planning (Koskela, 1999). Many proportions have proved to be ambiguous: either there is no positive evidence of increased safety or it is increased from a partial point of view. Much of the discussion of planning for safety has had a tendency to focus only on physical environments. Environmental determinism has been characteristic for the relationship between design and crime (Koskela and Pain, 2000). The critics have shown that social factors easily overcome the physical design, and that at its best design can be used to create preconditions for social change. However, in practice the preference to focus on physical environments has been persistent: often seeking for solutions has concentrated on design matters. Planning has been too much about 'designing out fear'.

It was as long ago as early 70s when Oscar Newman (1972) presented his idea of 'defensible space'. Many interpretations and misinterpretations have followed since those times. Nevertheless, the limits and possibilities of 'designing out' crime have not changed much. The original idea presented by Newman was to use design not to deter crime but to enable social practices, which deter crime. The concept of 'social space' in urban planning might support the understanding of different strategies: when we aim at long-lasting crime prevention it is essential to focus on changes in social space rather than merely design. This, as several examples clearly show, is not easy. While increased safety is commonly accepted as a significant aim, there is much less consensus as to the means by which it could be achieved. It would be important to adapt more sensitive approaches, providing a combination of social and situational interventions in attempts to increase safety.

The questions of security should not be regarded as independent of the critical evaluation of the changing notion of planning. While the main theme in planning in the 1960s was efficiency, in the 1980s it was ecology. In the 21st century the master

narrative of urban planning seems to be 'fear'. The obsession with security is the leading trend of contemporary urban design (e.g. Davis, 1990; Ellin, 1997). Everybody wants security. Nevertheless, 'security' is an ambivalent concept and the means that can be used to strive towards it are manifold. Sometimes even contradictory.

To explain this, I will present a diagram of two different planning 'cultures'. Now, this means that I will take a risk. This is because it is always risky to make binary oppositions. But I would like to argue that they could sometimes be fruitful, as used properly: not as a confinement but rather as a tool.

Diagram 1. The two different planning cultures for crime prevention.

CULTURES OF TOLERANCE	CULTURES OF PREJUDICE
Risky	secure
Long term	short sighted
Sensitive	conservative
Contextual	universal
Difference	sameness/Otherness
Togetherness	segregation
Flexibility	protection
Openness	control
Discussion	design
Social solutions	structural solutions

I use the word 'culture' in purpose. Crime prevention is not a narrow practise of any kind, but rather, there is a whole range of values and preferences embedded in each solution. The list I present might seem naive and intentional. Nobody wants to support prejudice. Nevertheless, there is a tremendous amount of concrete practical examples showing how easy it is to slide towards these kinds of solutions. Despite the long tradition of critical criminology, solutions based on the best knowledge available are rare.

For those who hope for practical thinking rather than theoretical reasoning, I suggest that when you follow the paper you keep in mind that the diagram presented can be used as a 'checking list' for evaluating each original project. Rather than developing ideas considering what to do about criminality I will present a polarisation showing what not to do about criminality. However, the both sides are always present when we develop strategies. It is fruitful to make a comparison. It can be a way to find the best practices.

First opposition in the diagram is risky versus secure. It is likely, that intolerant practises produce 'secure' environments, in the hard sense of this word. 'Target hardening', for example, can deter crime if the solutions really are hard enough. Gates will keep unwanted people out if they are strong enough, high enough, and always locked. In this sense, choosing a tolerant approach can be argued to be a contradiction in terms: it always means taking a risk. But it can be worth it. This is because, as the next opposition long term versus shortsighted argues, the influence of hard solutions tends to faint as time passes. To put it simple, hard solutions keep criminals out but do not reduce criminality. The cultures tolerance will be able to offer solutions that are long lasting. It is presumed that the practices should be local and contextual in order to work. Sensitive approach is presented here as an opposition to the conservative attitude, which expects that same solutions apply to all circumstances; that it is possible to develop a universal model for crime prevention.

Further, the cultures of tolerance acknowledge difference. People have different life styles and different phases during their life course. People have different needs and values. People also face different threats according to the colour of their skin, their gender, sexual orientation, and social status. The intolerant cultures assume that everybody should be the same - meaning what is sometimes called 'good respectable citizens' - and that those who are not, are Others, with a capital O. From this it follows that the others should be separated from the respectable ones. Segregation is accepted as a tool for increasing security. In contrast, there can be an aim for togetherness, without a pressure to be similar. However, this also means that sometimes one should

be able to accept behaviour that is not respectful and appreciated, nor similar to one's own.

From accepting the idea of segregation, it follows that control is used to keep out the others. Openness is another choice. It is possible to include everybody - even the so-called marginal groups - when seeking for good practice. This applies especially to the youth, as I shall argue in the next part of this paper. Applying the culture of tolerance also means flexibility. The practices should change according to the situation. Instead, another choice is protection, which means stability. What it comes to the planning practices, the opposition here is discussion versus design. Protective architecture is an easy solution, which can be applied without negotiation. Openness means that every solution should be discussed. This again, leads towards social solutions, instead of structural ones. In the end of the day, negotiation, co-operation and education can be more effective in curbing crime than design and structural changes.

In the following parts of this paper, I will present three vignettes to describe what these two different 'cultures' might mean in practice. All three are from Finland, which might be a disadvantage, since all the other Scandinavian countries seem to be ahead what it comes to discussion about crime prevention and the strategies available. My point is; however, to show the difference between the two cultures postulated, rather than present progressive examples. My aim is to provide juxtapositions.

The politics of control - which has the right to urban space? (vignette 1)

First, a vignette describing 'the politics of control'. There are over 350 surveillance cameras in the metro stations of Helsinki only. Nobody knows how many there are in the whole city, but it is clear that a person, who walks around the city centre of Helsinki, is constantly under surveillance. Surveillance cameras are also becoming more and more popular in residential areas - especially high-class neighbourhoods - to prevent burglary. In Finland, there is no register of the cameras. No permission or notice is needed if one wants to install a surveillance camera. Instead, permission or a notice is needed if one wants to play a guitar, organise a demonstration, or sell handicrafts in the street. Nobody knows who uses the surveillance cameras and to what purposes. It has been estimated that the so-called 'security industry' is the second fastest growing industry in Finland, right after the mobile phone production.

These points relate to urban development on a more general level. Increasing control makes some feel safer. At the same time, it creates cumulative fear, racism and distrust. The massive expansion of protection thus leads to a vicious circle of defence (Davis, 1990). Space is being designed as exclusionary rather than more open, paradoxically, in the name of safety. What seems not to have been realised is that there is an inescapable choice between 'a fortress approach' and 'an increased tolerance approach' (Koskela, 1999).

Increasing control is an easy way to react to crime and fear of crime. Security sells. It is a good business. The politics of control, however, are much more complex than it seems at the first sight. It is essential to ask, who has the right to urban space? If someone controls a particular space, this means that some are allowed to 'enter' while others are not. No matter how tolerant the policies of control seem, there will always exist those who are excluded. The difficult questions remain: Who are the ones who are left out? Where are they left? What happens to them? Who is responsible? Who are the ones who are protected? How public is 'public space', really? These questions apply to practices of control everywhere from the tiniest small-scale urban terminal spaces; to the development of whole urban regions where so called 'gated communities' have started to appear (see Blakely and Snyder, 1997). We wish to exclude but not to be excluded (Marcuse, 1997).

Exclusive forms and electronic means of surveillance are more and more often replacing informal social control. Often surveillance is regarded as a taken-for-granted development. Studies on video surveillance indicate that methods chosen have an impact on the results (Honest and Charmann, 1992). According to opinion polls, public opinion is very favourable towards surveillance. In contrast, qualitative research encouraging free discussion indicates that people do not necessarily regard surveillance as a good means for increasing safety. Compared to street surveys, focus group discussions encourage participants to point out issues considering civil liberty and other problems in surveillance, such as its ability to curb mainly minor crime.

What causes most mistrust towards the technical ability of the camera is its ability to react mainly backward: it is designed more to solve crime than to prevent it. The strength of surveillance lies in co-ordinating a response (Oc and Tiesdell, 1997; Fyfe and

Bannister, 1998; Takala, 1998). For a victim of violence the help mediated by a camera may come too late. In the case of an attack it might be possible to use the videotape to catch the offender(s), and use it as evidence in court, but this would never erase the actual experience of violence.

A common argument in favour of surveillance is that for those who have 'nothing to hide' surveillance should not be a problem. This is, however, a very narrow perspective. It does not tell us what 'surveillance society' is about (cf. Lyon, 2001). The causes behind crime should be looked at more. Technical solutions, such as surveillance cameras, do not promote that purpose. Crime is a problem which relates to more widespread social questions such as inequality and polarisation in society. These questions are beyond the reach of technical surveillance.

Some of the power-relationships embedded within surveillance change space, and produce complex relationships between power and space (Koskela, 2000). The 'technology of power' in video surveillance is very similar as the idea of a famous prison 'the Panopticon': to be seen but to never know when or by whom (Foucault, 1977). It can be claimed that through surveillance cameras the panoptic technology of power has been electronically extended: our cities have become like enormous Panopticons.

Gender, harassment, fear and street violence (vignette 2)

The second vignette focuses on gender issues. According to a study conducted in 2000, 59 per cent of women in inner Helsinki had experienced sexual harassment during the year past (Koskela et al., 2000). In a well know street prostitution area the figure was 69 per cent. In 2001, 58 per cent of women indicated that they are worried about moving around in the evenings in the city centre (Keskinen, 2002). In the residential areas the figure was 32 per cent.

The new security strategy for Helsinki does not mention sex-related violence or sexual harassment in the streets at all (Helsingin kaupungin turvallisuusstrategia, 2000). In actual fact, it doesn't mention words 'woman', 'women', 'gender' or 'sex' even once in the whole report. It does mention crime against vehicles, prevention of petty larceny and reduction of graffiti. Special target groups mentioned are young people and immigrants, but men who treat women offensively in public space are

not mentioned. In none of the other new municipal security strategies launched in Finland is there a single mention of sexual harassment. Fear of crime is acknowledged, but the gendered nature of it is ignored.

There are elements of urban life that cannot be understood without gender relations. I would argue that the question of safety is precisely such an issue. People's perception of risk reaches far beyond individual imagination. Fear of violence is a crucial element when the quality of life is evaluated. People's perception of risk depends, first of all, on their gender: according to surveys from all over the world, women are more worried of being a victim of street violence than men. Women perceive a threat of sexual violence, barely felt by men, and women are also more likely than men to restrict their spatial behaviour because of fear (Gardner, 1995; Wekerle and Whitzman, 1995). Threat of sexual harassment and violence does, to some extent, touch all women. And further, it seems to follow women during their life course, forming a 'continuum' of violence (Kelly, 1987).

Research on women's fear shows clearly that in reducing fear social factors are of more importance than environmental factors. It has been argued that some environments can become markers of unsafety but this does not mean that they are the cause of fear (Koskela and Pain, 2000). It is apparent that it is the social connotations of environmental signs of danger that women find worrying. Hence, planning as physical design remains restricted in the extent to which it can intervene in safety issues (Morrell, 1996; see also Trench et al., 1992). The root causes of fear are social and, thus, physical interventions or technical solutions will not help. In order to achieve improvements in safety, the role of the design in reducing fear should be understood within a wider context of social and economic measures (Pain, 1991). From this perspective, the concept of planning needs to be re-evaluated. It should be seen as a comprehensive process aiming to develop not only physical but also social space. In addition, it should aim to understand and take into account the symbolic connotations embedded in space and, perhaps of most importance, the social relations that contribute to the production of space. What it comes to planning for safety, gender power relations are particularly crucial.

The Scandinavian countries have a reputation of supporting gender equality. Despite of this myth, sexual harassment still seems to be a taboo. Although it is known that sexual harassment has a crucial effect on how particular areas are perceived, and that fear of violence is an important factor in measuring the quality of life, quite often these issues are not discussed in urban planning. In Scandinavian countries, research on the women's fear is relatively new, although getting more prevalent (see e.g. Tiby, 1991; Auren, 1999; Koskela, 1999; Djurhuus and Skovsgaard, 2000; Laakkonen and Mustikkamäki, 2000; Listerborn, 2000). However, the results that the research projects have gained are not always visible in planning and urban policies. Safety has not often been among the aims of a planning that take better account of women's needs. The role of non-criminal street violence - sexual harassment, for example - in increasing women's fear has barely been discussed. The contribution of such experiences to women's lives is easily trivialised. Harassment against women also contains an element of physical threat, but this is easily overlooked. Sexual harassment is impossible to design out which means that in order to discuss it the parties should be capable of grasping the issues of social space. The subject is difficult, and hence, has not been taken seriously enough, at least on a local level. Gender remains absent. The security strategy of Helsinki is a glaring example of this.

The Youth, Accessibility, Policing and Subcultures (vignette 3)

All of the 50 biggest municipalities in Finland mention juvenile crime as a potential or realised problem in their security strategies. In only three cities the local youth has had the possibility to take part in the preparation of the strategy (Niiranen and Siivola, 2002). One of the concrete manifestations of interfering the problems caused by the youth is the struggle against graffiti. In year 2000, the budget for all youth work in Helsinki was 19 million Euro, 90 per cent of which went to rents and salaries - leaving 1,9 million Euro for the actual activities. In the same year, the budget for the anti graffiti campaign in Helsinki - called 'Stop daubing' - was 2,5 million Euro (Cantell and Kuvaja, 2002).

While women remain absent from the local security strategies the youth, on the other hand, is of different order. It is very telling that in almost every municipality in Finland,

the youth is presented as one of the most serious problems faced (Niiranen and Siivola, 2002). I would argue that the youth is 'over-represented'. This is not to deny that in some places juvenile crime may be a problem, nor to neglect the importance of cutting the 'vicious circle' of crime early enough. However, I would argue that the reason for mentioning the youth as a problem is not that Finland would have a serious problem in juvenile crime. Rather, it seems to be easy to present the youth as the threat number one because they are 'a good enemy': without the power to resist. They cannot vote.

Sometimes, petty crime is presented in a light of a moral panic. The policies are close to zero tolerance - no negotiation - and the consequences to the wrongdoers are beyond understanding. The anti-graffiti policy in Helsinki is a glaring example of this type of an attitude. There are two persistent beliefs among the officials: that cleaning graffiti immediately will prevent further painting, and that the lawful graffiti will increase the unlawful ones (Cantell and Kuvaja, 2002). The critics of these theories are ignored. The 'Stop daubing' campaign is not interested in what the youth does in their spare time but only on what they should not do - meaning, painting graffiti. The fines that the most active painters have been asked to pay are so high that the youngsters will probably never be able to earn such sums of money. Hence, because of the strict policy, they will be 'dropped out' of the society forever. There is a risk that this will encourage them to further criminal activity.

A tremendous amount of resources is used to protect property, clean graffiti, and catch the 'offenders' - or should I state 'artists'? It is not a new idea to present graffiti as a form of art (Jacobson, 1990; Isomursu and Jääskeläinen, 1998). In Helsinki, the museum of contemporary art, Kiasma, has started to buy graffiti for their collections. This has caused an open conflict between Kiasma and the national railway company VR together with the authorities of the 'Stop daubing' campaign. The most controversial question has been 'who is allowed to define what is art?' It can be asked which should have more credibility in a conflict situation, the head of the Railway Company or the head of the museum of contemporary art?

It is clear that paintings on the walls of residential areas - especially the ones perceived ugly - raise anger. However, no results have been presented in Finland indicating that graffiti would cause fear. Rather, graffiti has been perceived as either beautiful or annoying, depending on its aesthetic values (Koskela, 1999). If a particular

group - or a form of behaviour, such as graffiti painting - is presented as a threat people easily take this for granted. The perspective of everyday life is sometimes quite narrow. From another point of view it can be argued that the youth has a role in our society: they are the critics. Graffiti is a way to mediate this critic (Ley and Cybriwsky, 1974; Castleman, 1982). It is not (only) damaging public property.

A different Approach?

I shall now conclude my discussion of the three vignettes by imagining what could be different. How could these examples take advantage of the diagram of 'cultures of tolerance' versus 'cultures of prejudice', which I presented in the beginning of my paper? I shall pick up suitable key words for each example, aiming to show that there is a possibility to apply a different approach.

The Politics of Control - which has the Right to Urban Space? (vignette1)

- * Long term: it should be evaluated whether another solution would be better in order to avoid crime displacement and provide sustainable improvements
- * Social solutions: whenever possible, (informal) social control should be encouraged instead of technical solutions
- * Contextual: surveillance should be used only in spaces where it is truly the best possible solution, residential areas not being first on the list
- * Openness: whenever surveillance is used the practices should be as open as possible and the location of the monitoring room should be known by the public
- Togetherness: the security personnel should openly participate criminological discussion, because this would increase their reliability

Gender, Harassment, Fear and Street Violence (vignette 2)

- * Difference: it should be acknowledged that people have different perception of urban space according to their gender, sexual orientation, colour of their skin etc.
- * Openness: gender relations should not be ignored, but discussed openly as an important aspect in urban planning
- * Sensitive: planning should be sensitive to these issues and not ignore emotional aspects, such as women's experiences of sexual harassment or fear of violence
- * Discussion: different views should be present when crime prevention policies are negotiated

- Social solutions: urban planning should not be only design, but include social aspects and education

The youth, Accessibility, Policing and Subcultures (vignette 3)

- * Togetherness: the youth should be able to take part and say their word when local security strategies are prepared, together with the authorities and other parties
- * Flexibility: planners should aim to understand different subcultures, not only doom them
- * Long term: a longer perspective may enable us to question the role of graffiti, sliding from 'a daubing perspective' towards 'an art perspective'
- * Contextual: the different forms of juvenile crime are not equally serious
- * Risky: the youth has a critical role in society and this should not be ignored

In each case the list could be longer. These points are examples of how critical evaluation could work in practice. Crime prevention is a political practice. Accordingly, in each case there is a different approach available if one wants to seek for it and has enough 'political imagination' to see what could be the alternative strategy.

Conclusions

A risk is a social construction. In our days, crime prevention is treated as a solution to more widespread problems. The insecurity we feel is far beyond the crime we face in our everyday lives. Finland is a good example of this: during the 90s the crime figures did not get up but the figures indicating insecurity did. When people feel insecure the reaction is to increase crime prevention, using especially the seemingly non-political, easy solutions such as protective design. Many figures will be presented during this conference. However, we must understand that we will never reach a 'pure' value free, objective truth by research. Often the knowledge we gain is complicated and difficult to use for practical solutions. Too often easy solutions overrun the more difficult ones although it was known that a critical perspective is essential.

For developing conscious urban security policies it would be essential to base the crime prevention policy debate not simply on pure crime figures, but also on values and preferences. What kind of crimes are the most important to curb? What measures are currently used in urban planning in order to improve safety? Which is preferred, maximal crime prevention at any social cost, or the feelings of safety and well being? What kind of power-relationships is there embedded in increased control? Is space designed for everybody - literally - or for the well-behaving middle class only? Should the youth and the drunkards have an equal right to the city as the middle aged 'good respectable citizens'? The worst possible vision, in my opinion, is that planning for crime prevention means a dictatorship of the white middle-aged middle class. This represents a 'culture of prejudice' in its worst sense.

There may be local cases where increased control and zero-tolerance policy has been successful. At least the promoters of such policy do their best to convince us that this is the case. That does not, however, undermine the fact that the politics of control often work only temporarily and 'sweep the problems under the carpet'. The same problems will be ahead of us, either as they were, or in another form. A perspective for fifty years ahead will reveal us what is the difference between the cultures of tolerance and the cultures of prejudice. It is easy to decide about crime prevention measures with a short-term perspective. Protection may look like a good solution. But if we imagine how our

cities will look like if we continue on the road of protection - if these types of solutions will be multiplied in space and time - the result will be exposed.

Nan Ellin (1997) has used a term 'the architecture of fear'. As a reaction to insecurity, design is easily used to create areas, which mediate the message: 'this is dangerous'. The conclusion of this is that people will perceive these areas dangerous. Hence, the situation should never be regarded as worse than it actually is. As long as risks are relatively small, they should be taken. If a city is designed to look like the environment is dangerous, the danger will be embedded in people's imaginations although there was no original reason for that. We face a vicious circle of fear. Fear is (re-re-re-) reproduced by design.

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Towards a European Knowledge Base

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Introduction

Crime is a problem which affects us all as individuals, as families, as communities, as states and at the level of the EU itself. Preventing that crime, and - more important than numbers - alleviating the bad **consequences** of crime for our lives in health, home, travel, shopping, business, governance and leisure is an interest we all share, and a responsibility we should all accept. But crime is not always easy to control - to do so costs time, effort, and sometimes part of our freedom and privacy - and there are many more demands on our scarce resources to satisfy than crime alone. It is therefore vital that we perform the tasks of crime prevention as well as we possibly can. This means striving always for good practice, and sharing our knowledge of it - pooling the benefits not just of our greater numbers but more importantly, of our different experiences, different methods, different approaches to innovation, in a way which can stimulate and challenge the fixed views we all get when working and thinking in the context of just one country. Sharing knowledge on what works is the theme of this conference, and of course it is central to the goals of the EUCPN.

We now have good evidence in principle that diverse kinds of crime prevention can successfully, and even cost-effectively, reduce crime (eg Goldblatt and Lewis 1998). Many of these approaches promise to be more effective, and have fewer side-effects, than traditional repressive measures - although these, of course, remain necessary. And they have the potential to make a significant difference to people's quality of life - if the approaches are based on reliable evidence **and** implemented well.

Defining, capturing, storing, retrieving and transferring knowledge of good practice is a difficult process. Even medicine and medical science find it a challenge to become a fully evidence-based discipline, but for the softer, social science approaches central to crime prevention it's even harder to achieve.

Evaluation is a demanding task, and takes time, money and commitment to give results which are reliable enough for policymakers and practitioners to use with confidence. Therefore, our supply is so far pretty limited, although we see a steady growth in the evidence base that evaluation aims to build, as the examples collected for this conference show (This lack of reliable evaluation coverage was more systematically identified in the report to the US Congress by Sherman, Eck and colleagues in 1997.) The **Campbell collaboration**² is a laudable move to conduct systematic and rigorous **reviews of evaluation** of what works in specific fields of social research such as crime prevention. It is modelled on a similar programme in medical science. The UK Home Office recently published 2 of these reviews, on the effectiveness of CCTV (Welsh and Farrington 2002) and of street lighting (Farrington and Welsh 2002). These show what can be done through such systematic reviews and what still needs to be done to fill the gaps in our ability to reliably inform strategy and practice.

But my main focus is not on the state of impact evaluation or the supply of evaluation studies, which is worthy of an EU conference in itself. It's about the next stage - that of taking rigorous knowledge of what works in crime prevention, making it available to practitioners and policymakers, and ensuring it is used - what the French call valorisation. Governments and practitioners are becoming increasingly alert to this issue as a key ingredient in the success of delivering mainstream crime prevention programmes.

There is growing awareness that knowledge does not flow like water naturally from source to mainstream, but has to be actively moved uphill. Passive dissemination is not enough to ensure implementation of research findings and the adoption of an evidence-based approach (Nutley and Davies, 2000). Consequently, alongside efforts to **generate** knowledge through research, development, evaluation and high-quality evaluation reviews such as the Campbell Collaboration, explicit efforts to **transfer** that knowledge are being stepped up. Right now there is much activity involving a mix of climate-

² Following the success of the Cochrane Collaboration in reviewing health care interventions, the Campbell Collaboration was founded in February 2000 to produce systematic reviews of social, educational and criminological interventions. The aim of the Campbell Collaboration is to make the best knowledge about "What Works" immediately available electronically (e.g. on the World Wide Web) to all interested persons, including scholars, practitioners, policy makers and the general public. These systematic reviews will be subject to rigorous quality control, will cover research throughout the world, will be regularly updated and will be revised in the light of cogent criticisms. The Campbell Collaboration further aims to stimulate higher-quality evaluations to feed the knowledge-gathering process in the future. Farrington and Petrosino (2001) describe the general background to Campbell and the aims of the Crime and Justice Group in particular. The general website is <http://campbell.gse.upenn.edu> and that of the crime & justice group is www.aic.gov.au/campbellcj

setting, education and training, practitioner networks, guidance material such as toolkits and the establishment of knowledge bases. This activity can be found in a number of individual EU countries as well as international organisations such as Europol, Council of Europe, ICPC in Montréal (www.crime-prevention-intl.org), and of course EUCPN. In the UK, the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit in government (www.renewal.net), and academically-based initiatives centred on Research Utilisation in Scotland (www.st-and.ac.uk/~cppm/ruru.htm) and the UK Centre for Evidence-based Policy (www.evidencenetwork.org) are producing interesting material.

This trend towards actively organising the transfer of knowledge is accelerating. This is especially because we are now more conscious that social and technological change, and adaptive, innovative criminals can make what used to work in preventing crime, irrelevant or obsolete. We have to catch up, and then innovate faster than they can. But rather than accelerate blindly we should all pause to think. When designing any knowledge base or setting out any training curriculum, we must be very clear why we are doing it and what exactly we are hoping to transfer. To rush into construction is to risk wasted expense and effort on the part of the designers and compilers, and confusion and lost opportunity for practitioners. Past attempts at knowledge bases have not always succeeded.

Help is available from one particular direction: a set of approaches known as '**knowledge management**' appears to have emerged as a discipline almost overnight, to cater generically for an increasingly knowledge-driven society. Knowledge management (see for example Macintosh (1999) for one description of the field - and www.aiai.ed.ac.uk/~alm/kamlnks.html) requires investment in the capture of knowledge, sharing of that knowledge, ensuring it flows effectively, and promoting its application. In effect it aims to embed within an organisation or a network an entire knowledge-culture and set of supporting systems (even to the extent of 'knowledge proofing' all other processes and facilities).

However, this approach, while potentially very useful, is not sufficient because it is **content-free**. We need to put some of that content back, by dealing with knowledge in fairly generic terms but attuned to what we know about crime prevention and how it is implemented. My aim in this paper is first, to identify some of these special features of prevention; and second, to introduce my attempt to construct the outlines of a

knowledge schema which respects these features. By this I mean the 5Is approach featured in the papers for the conference. I should say right now that the form of the 5Is is not fixed, but experimental - it's a development model. I would greatly welcome your views on the principles, the details and the practicalities.

I start the main part of my paper by exploring the purpose of knowledge in practical prevention, and the form it should take to reflect our understanding of how prevention really works. This leads to a specification for a good practice knowledge base - setting out some of the features and the structure that we need to make it useful and useable. The next part takes us through an example of the 5Is framework in use, using the UK project descriptions, mainly the burglary one. That is followed by a report-back on my experiences in preparing or editing those descriptions - how did the principle work in practice? The conclusion returns to the question - is it worth the effort?

The purpose of crime prevention knowledge

Let's begin with a very fundamental question. What is the purpose of knowledge? I'm sure there are as many answers as there are schools of philosophy, but in the present practical context, I take it **as improving, extending and sustaining performance in crime prevention.** (That performance itself depends on the knowledge being shared in a wider climate of public and political understanding, but I do not address this here.)

A wide variety of people and institutions, private, public and commercial, act as purposeful crime preventers who carry out tasks which deliver crime prevention interventions or otherwise support them. These tasks can range from formal and professional policing, probation and the punishment and rehabilitation of offenders, to dedicated private security services, to the design of products and environments against crime, to surveillance and site management by employees (such as railway station staff), to self-protection and informal social control through ordinary citizens.

Purposeful performance of these individuals and institutions is about transforming inputs of money, time and wider human resources into desired outcomes.

Improvements in the performance of crime prevention practitioner roles involve making better judgements, decisions and actions, and we can identify several common features. Some of these relate to good practice in individual projects, others

to the overall strategy for meeting the preventive needs of an area or a set of people, which may involve coordinating a whole series of projects and services:

- * Better **responsiveness** to individual crime problems and to the problems of an area as a whole, including
 - * **prioritisation** of prevention - tackling the most serious problems, and helping the most vulnerable avoid victimisation or to cope with it.
 - * Accurate **targeting** on needs of victim and wider society, and on causes of crime;
 - * More complete **coverage** on the ground, in terms of what **proportion** of a given crime problem it can tackle. It may sometimes be most cost-effective to target only the worst-hit areas or the most serious crimes, but there are also benefits from interventions which can protect more targets of crime or influence more offenders, even if less efficiently.
 - * Wider **scope**, in terms of the **range** of different crime problems preventers are willing and able to tackle - highly specific or broad-spectrum.
- * Greater **effectiveness** and **cost-effectiveness** of the preventive solutions implemented - the heart of the 'what works' mission.
- * Greater **sustainability** - in terms of how long the implementation of the preventive activity can be maintained, or how long the preventive effect itself lasts.
- * Avoidance of significant undesirable **side-effects** of action - such as stigmatisation of areas or people, interference with other values and policy areas such as privacy or environmental pollution, or even displacement of crime onto more vulnerable victims.
- * Greater **legitimacy or acceptability** of preventive actions, within the wider population, within minority subgroups, or even among offenders themselves.

I'm sure you can think of more features of good practice - perhaps these can emerge in the workshop discussions.

Money, staff, legitimacy and motivation are all needed to achieve good performance, combined with the right occupational culture, organisational procedures, structures and management frameworks. But none of these are much use without reliable knowledge. Knowledge is not merely a distinct and detachable component, of course,

but something which provides the core substance and connects the whole show together.

Crime prevention knowledge - its basic content

What, then, can we know about crime and its prevention, in order to improve our performance? We can actually identify five distinct types of knowledge, set out in the material circulated before this conference:

- (1) **Know-about crime problems** - knowledge about crime problems and their costs and wider consequences for victims and society, offenders' modus operandi, legal definitions of offences, patterns and trends in criminality, empirical risk and protective factors and theories of causation.
- (2) **Know-what works** - knowledge of which causes of crime can be manipulated - what preventive methods work, against what crime problem, in what context, by what intervention mechanism/s, with what side-effects and what cost-effectiveness, for whose cost and benefit.
- (3) **Know-how to put into practice** - knowledge and skills of implementation and other practical processes, operation of equipment, extent and limits of legal powers and duties to intervene, research, measurement and evaluation methodologies; operation at the political level if appropriate.
- (4) **Know-who to involve** - knowledge of contacts for ideas and advice, potential partners and collaborators who can be mobilised as formal or informal preventers, and their motives and constraints; service providers, suppliers of funds, equipment and other specific resources; and sources of wider support.
- (5) **Know-why** - knowledge of the symbolic, emotional, ethical, cultural and value-laden meanings of crime and preventive action including fairness and justice. Failure to address these can cause even the most rational and evidence-based actions to be rejected. The classic example is the public outrage sometimes caused by expensive sporting activities for young offenders (even if the activities are evidence-based).

Doing practical, operational crime prevention involves gaining, and applying, all five Ks. But let's now move from the content of knowledge to its form and how it can be

used. What does research tell us about the most suitable form for transferring it from research to practice, or from one practitioner to others?

Crime prevention knowledge - its form

Research on the implementation of crime prevention has identified some serious issues about the form of knowledge we must capture, and how it is applied (reviewed in Ekblom, 2002).

Crime prevention is about 'intervening in the causes of criminal events, to reduce the risk of their occurrence and the potential seriousness of their consequences' (Ekblom, 2001). Research shows that the causation of crime is, like that of any social interaction, very complex. An important observation made by Nick Tilley (1993a) is the way in which a given crime preventive **method** seems to have the potential to act through a number of different causal **mechanisms**. For example, he identified 9 different ways by which CCTV in a car park could theoretically act to reduce crime. To take a simpler example, putting a wall around a heavily-burgled factory site (the method) **could physically block access** for the offender (mechanism 1); deter **and discourage** the offender due to increased perception of risk and effort, and less reward - the stolen computers have to be heaved over the wall (that's mechanism 2); and **help preventers** (mechanism 3) - employees or security guards only have to watch the official entrance, not the whole perimeter. In different contexts, different mechanisms may be active, so practitioners need to be alert to these possibilities to get the best out of their actions. When talking about mechanisms at a broad, generic level - such as deterrence - it is helpful to view them as **principles** which may apply across a range of types of crime or crime situation.

In contrast to this complex reality, many current **descriptions** of preventive interventions are **superficial and one-dimensional** (and rather too often, the action described is itself superficial). How, for example, can we evaluate, and replicate, something which refers merely to 'work with young people', with no clear communication of the causes of the crime problem and a lack of focus on the detailed causal mechanisms of prevention, by which the interventions are intended to work?

Attempts to copy 'success stories' show that **replication** is much harder than we may at first think. Tilley (1993b), again, studied a number of attempted replications, in the course of the UK's Safer Cities programme, of the highly successful Kirkholt burglary

prevention demonstration project (Forrester et al., 1988, 1990). The replications of Kirkholt strikingly failed to deliver such good results as the original. Why was this? Simply put, cookbook copying - that is, superficially and literally copying the end-product activities of someone else's crime prevention project - doesn't work. Tilley (eg Pawson and Tilley 1997) proposes a very helpful way of expressing this. For a preventive method to work and thus deliver the right **outcome**, the right **causal mechanism** has to be triggered and implemented in the right **context**. This is like saying that for an ordinary match to set fire to some wood, this can only happen when the wood is dry and there is no wind or rain. We are normally unaware of these necessary contextual conditions - they are at the back of our mind. But if we want to light a fire in other conditions, although the principle is the same we may have to create some shelter, dry off the wood or use more powerful firelighters. Perhaps, also, we need to recruit the help of other people to implement these conditions, and in different circumstances they may or may not willingly cooperate.

This requirement of customising the preventive method to the context means that each time you try to replicate some good practice in a different context, you cannot literally copy it but have to go through the whole intelligent **process** of identifying the crime problem and its causes, planning a suitable intervention, implementing it and adjusting in the light of feedback. Every new context is different - especially when we are sharing knowledge internationally, but even when copying some successful project in the next town. Therefore, what we think of as **replication**, in crime prevention, begins to look more like reconstruction, where the end product may differ according to the context in which it is reconstructed. It also looks rather similar to repeated **innovation**.

This link with innovation is important for several reasons. Because our evaluation knowledge is **incomplete**, the supply of detailed good practice knowledge is much less than the demand for it. Even where we do have some evaluated knowledge of what works, the success of replications is highly **context dependent**, as just said. And in the medium-term, **crime and the social and technological context of prevention are continually changing**, so we have to innovate to keep up.

Under all these circumstances, we would do better to arm our practitioners with a set of **generic principles** of prevention and knowledge of the design process rather than supply them merely with large numbers of fixed solutions which may not always fit,

and which may eventually become obsolete. More broadly put, we have to help practitioners to think less like technicians selecting a simple prepackaged remedy from a limited menu, like a service engineer with a broken washing machine; and more like **expert consultants**, using these principles to innovate and reconfigure their diagnoses and solutions as they go.

Specification for a good practice knowledge base

We can now set out some requirements for a good practice knowledge base that respects these understandings of crime prevention knowledge and is fit for purpose. There are two main aspects to consider: the **features** of knowledge, and the **organisation** of that knowledge. But first, let us briefly remind ourselves of the main **purpose** of knowledge-bases.

Immediate purpose of knowledge bases

The **immediate purpose** of knowledge bases, of course, is **operational**. When practitioners open up, or switch on, the knowledge base, they want to select preventive methods, which are suitable to tackle their own crime problems in their own regional and local context. After selection, they hopefully move on to intelligent **replication** of whole projects or **elements** of good practice. For example, if a burglary scheme has a rather ordinary intervention, it may still have an extremely useful and novel method of mobilising the local community - an element of good practice which could be used in a range of other circumstances - for example in tackling car crime.

Where no direct good practice example fits, or can be adapted - which may happen often - a good knowledge base should not leave practitioners in the dark, but should still help them to **innovate**.

Features of knowledge to be captured

Let's now summarise the features of knowledge that we need to capture in the light of the previous discussion.

It must attempt to describe **process** in a way that promotes selection of appropriate actions, and their intelligent reconstruction, by describing every stage of developing and delivering the action.

It must extract information on the original **context** of the project, and how that context was thought to contribute to successful analysis, intervention, implementation and impact. One important factor to capture in adapting to different contexts is what I

call **Troublesome Tradeoffs** (Ekblom 2002). By this I mean the tricky balances that must be struck in designing any crime prevention activity (such as a surveillance strategy for a shopping centre) or product (such as a crime-resistant car). How to maximise security for reasonable cost whilst also respecting convenience, privacy, aesthetics, environmental issues, social exclusion and sales? While the general principles behind a new replication may be similar to the original, the pressures, constraints and possibilities for realisation may be very different in new contexts, leading to rather different solutions in practice.

The knowledge base must help practitioners to flip between thinking at several **levels**. From an immediate, implementation perspective, we have to help practitioners think, and share information about, tangible **methods** - like CCTV, or youth clubs, or gates on the alleyways behind houses. From an analytic perspective we have to try to extract information on **specific mechanisms and contexts, on higher-level principles** such as surveillance and even on theories - which, if supported by evidence, are the most generic, compressed and widely-applicable form of practical knowledge we can get! (Remember Kurt Lewin's claim that there is nothing so practical as a good theory.)

Given the importance of process, we should be able to retrieve good practice **elements** of action derived from each stage of a project.

The emphasis on cross-cutting elements and principles also suggests the importance of terminology - especially important in international use. The lack of consistent terminology limits what can be described and retrieved in a knowledge base. This is especially a problem with **international** knowledge bases like the one that is now emerging through the EUCPN. And it is especially important where we are trying to capture, retrieve and use, **elements** of good practice from projects rather than a single, global 'did it work?' picture. Some while ago, the French organisation IHESI produced a very good Anglo-French lexicon of policing terms. It was interesting to see that much of the effort was not simply to translate from one language to another, but to get the **concept** across. The English term 'community policing', for example, at that time took a full paragraph to convey in French.

We are therefore moving into the territory of **conceptual frameworks** - as some of you know, one of my favourite subjects, and worth spending a little time on. Apart from hindering international communication, the lack of a conceptual framework has several other serious consequences for the performance of crime prevention.

- * It inhibits **communication and collaboration** between diverse partners: the police may use one term, local government officers a different one.
- * It affects clarity of **planning** preventive action, and
- * **Quality assurance** of implementation.
- * It contributes to the compartmentalisation of strategic **thinking** - some people speak only an enforcement language, others the language of civil prevention. And some focus exclusively on situations, others just on offenders.
- * There is a failure of **practice** to test and refine **theory**, and failure of theory to inform practice.
- * **Education and training** lack a coherent basis.

Anthropologists such as Bloch (2000) note that efficient replication depends on there already being in the mind of the receiving party a substantial cognitive **schema**, or conceptual framework, primed to interpret and assimilate the message. This suggests that a strategy for knowledge transfer needs an early 'foundation' training course to teach the schema. Specific items of knowledge are then joined onto it during the practitioner's professional life - from knowledge bases, guidance updates, continuing professional development, and live collaboration with researchers possessed of the knowledge. Because the fundamentals of the message are already in place, the burden on the practitioners in taking in this new information is minimised. A schema can be developed if the knowledge base rises above the mere cataloguing of individual projects and seeks to **synthesise** an integrated framework of generic principles.

Organisation of crime prevention knowledge

This shopping list of desirable **features** of crime prevention knowledge has a lot of implications for its **organisation**. The knowledge must be structured to handle **multiple levels** - projects, methods, generic principles, specific mechanisms; it must distinguish between the different **stages** of the preventive process; and it must contain clearly identifiable **elements** to enable borrowing of ideas (say, on insertion) from one type of project to another. If this information is consistently highlighted, labelled or marked with hypertext or its equivalent, and there is an efficient search engine, practitioners can retrieve and exploit it much more.

We can also think about a range of **knowledge superstructures**. Cut the knowledge one way and we have case studies. Cut it another, and we have toolkits or something like them (see www.designagainstcrime.co.uk for an example of case studies, professional guidance toolkit and learning/training materials (available late 2002)). The toolkits in turn can be focused on specific crime problems, different types of intervention, or different aspects of process - for example one toolkit on methods and issues in Intelligence, another on Insertion. If all these structures have the same terminology and concepts and draw, through different types of user interface, on the same empirical material, then the benefits for communication and transfer of knowledge are obvious.

Conclusions so far

What conclusions have we reached in this assessment of knowledge for crime prevention? The results of rigorous impact evaluation remain central to the 'what works' mission. However, I hope to have shown that, if we are serious about sharing good practice, a lot more information needs to be **collected and assembled** from individual projects. Attention to process, to context, to mechanism and to theories and practical principles are all equally important for replication and innovation. In terms of the practice of evaluation itself, this means that we must find an appropriate balance between the effort dedicated to each aspect. In terms of project descriptions, we have to **present** much more information on successful projects than any superficial journalistic account would give. Balancing information content and readability is challenging, but with careful drafting, structure, and labelling, it can be done. The entire effort requires an investment in developing a common terminology supported by clearly defined conceptual framework, and continuous work in the background to synthesise practical principles and develop theories which join up with each other and say something about how they interact to give different outcomes in different contexts.

One framework which attempts to take account of what we know about crime prevention knowledge, and the specifications I've just described, in a systematic and rigorous way, is the 5Is.

The five I's: Experimental Framework for a Knowledge Base for Crime Prevention Projects

The 5Is framework is perhaps the latest in a series of attempts to capture the Preventive Process, which arguably began in the 1950s and 60s with the late Leslie Wilkins, one of the founders of applied criminology in Britain, and continued both in Home Office research and in parallel with Problem-Oriented Policing in the USA - where the acronym SARA appeared (Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessment).³

The five I's comprise:

- * **Intelligence** - gathering and analysing information on crime problems and their consequences, and diagnosing their causes and 'risk and protective factors' associated with criminality.
- * **Intervention** - considering the range of possible interventions that could be applied to block, disrupt or weaken those causes and manipulate the risk and protective factors.
- * **Implementation** - converting the in-principle interventions into practical methods, putting them into effect in ways which are appropriate for the local context
- * **Insertion** - mobilising other agencies, companies and individuals in the community to play their part in implementing the intervention, because the professionals, like the police, often have to work through others rather than directly blocking crimes or catching criminals. [Note: in future versions, Insertion will be called Involvement and will include both partnership and mobilisation.]
- * **Impact**, cost-effectiveness and process evaluation - assessment, feedback and adjustment.

Example description:

Strictly Burglary Reduction Project, Birmingham

The best way of explaining the sort of project description I believe we need for a knowledge base, is to work through an example. I'll use one of the 3 UK examples, the Stirchley burglary reduction project. One of our other examples does focus on local youth crime, and the other on a national project to reduce mobile phone crime, and you can find these in the circulated list of projects. I'll refer to them occasionally here, where

the Stirchley project doesn't illustrate the particular point I'm covering. So let's start to work our way through the 5Is. I've cut some of the detail but you can read about it in the full description.

Project description - The five I's

1. Intelligence

Intelligence involves gathering and analysing information on crime problems and their consequences, and diagnosing their causes and (with longer-term, developmental prevention) the 'risk and protective factors' in younger children's life circumstances associated with later criminality. It also involves building an overall picture of the problem area as context for the action.

What was the general context - the location of the problem?

The Stirchley project was located some 5km from Birmingham city centre. The area had good transport links to the centre and was within easy travelling distance to major employers. It contained some attractive residential areas with a variety of housing types. The population was some 21,000, 12% of whom were from ethnic minorities. The unemployment rate was around 5% (just over the UK average but a bit over half the Birmingham average).

The target area was located within the police beat of Stirchley, which was part of the King's Heath Operational Command Unit. The beat had a population of some 8600. A third of these were between 25-44 years old; a tenth were from ethnic minorities.

The project covered 9 residential streets, representing almost 17% of households in the Stirchley beat. The housing mainly comprised 2-storey 'terraces' (ie a number of houses joined in a continuous row along a street) or semi-detached homes dating from around 1900. Most residents were owner-occupiers of their homes, and most were long-term residents, although there were some students from the nearby university. Overall the area seemed fairly pleasant, but with a slightly 'run-down' appearance.

Within Stirchley, there were 2 subsidiary target areas. Area 1 contained a few vacant homes, plus some small businesses. Most houses backed onto each other in blocks. Some houses bordered parkland and a canal. In Area 2, houses lay side-by-side in a long chain and were open to parkland at the rear.

³ See the "COPS" series of guides at www.usdoj.gov/cops/cp_resources/pubs_ppse/default#Problem_Oriented_Policing

What was the crime problem that the project aimed to prevent?

The crime problem was residential burglary.

Were there any significant consequences of the crime problem/s?

Moving beyond the counting of crimes to investigate their consequences is important because these reflect economic and quality of life issues for victims and the wider community. We need this information in order to set priorities for prevention, meet needs of victims, and perhaps join up with other activity in the area, such as economic regeneration or housing improvement. With Stirchley, no especial consequences were noted in this case - apart from the usual unpleasant ones, of course. The UK estimate of national average material and social costs of domestic burglary were nearly £3300 per household in 2000.

How did the project team obtain evidence of the crime problem - what were the sources of information and analysis?

Crime pattern analysis from recorded police statistics showed that, in the 3 years prior to 1999, the Stirchley beat had a burglary rate well over twice the national average, with 217-241 incidents per year. There were two hotspots (Areas 1 and 2 already described) which accounted for a quarter of all burglaries on the beat. Further analysis showed that in over 80% of the burglaries in these hotspots, the offender had gained access via the rear of the house (this was markedly higher than a national average estimate of 60%, suggesting a specific vulnerability). Site visits by the police established the importance of environmental factors, in particular rear alleyways and other means of access.

Was any particular know-how used in data collection and analysis?

This would cover unusual techniques, such as systematic observation, interviews with offenders, or interesting kinds of software used for data capture and display, such as geographical information systems. In Stirchley there was nothing with any 'news value' to note, although practitioners new to this kind of approach could find a description of fairly standard techniques helpful for training purposes. Our UK mobile phone robbery project

What were the immediate causes and risk factors behind the crime problem?

Describing the logic of the project really requires us to focus on these - It's what defines prevention. Here, we need to know about the identifiable causes of the criminal events;

or any risk factors present and protective factors absent. Risk factors are correlates, usually associated with offending in later life, such as 'poor parental discipline'. It is not necessary to describe every risk factor or cause - only those which significantly relate to the intervention or determine the context for it to work.

Causes of crime are many and varied, and can act at a number of levels. A systematic way I have developed for describing these causes, and later, the interventions in those causes, is the *Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity* conceptual framework (Ekblom 2001). Basically, the CCO framework aims to bring together and integrate the causes of crime centring on the **situation** and the **offender**, which too often are considered in isolation; and it also seeks to provide a common way of thinking about preventive solutions. It covers solutions that are **both enforcement or justice-based**, and what can be called **civil** - prevention in the everyday world of education, leisure or the design and management of buildings, environments and cars. In this way, it tries to help practitioners focus rigorously and systematically on problems and their causes, and not to be fixed on any single causal perspective, type of solution, or kind of institution responsible for implementing it.

At the centre of the CCO framework are the immediate causes which come together to make the criminal event happen. [Figure 1 - at end] On the **offender** side, these range from the offender's criminality, their resources for avoiding crime, their immediate motivation to offend, resources for offending such as weapons, tools and knowhow, their decision to offend, and their presence in the crime situation. On the **situational** side, the immediate causes cover the property or person that is the target of crime, the target enclosure such as a house or car park, the wider environment such as a housing estate, and the two major roles that people other than the offender can play in the criminal event - crime preventers and crime promoters. Sadly I have no time to describe this in depth, but you can see more in the illustrative guidelines, and visit the website at www.crimereduction.gov.uk/cco.htm .

The Stirchley project focused mainly on situational causes.

Environment

Logistical aspects of the environment centred on a network of alleyways, adjacent to open land and a canal bank. These all afforded access to the rear of houses (one street block had a network of 14 alleys which gave rear access to over 70 houses), and *escape*

routes. The alleys in particular meant that, once offenders were in them, they were *concealed from surveillance*.

Target enclosure

An *inner* enclosure comprised the houses themselves, which presumably were vulnerable to rear break-ins. An outer enclosure was either absent, or had incomplete or ineffectual boundaries due to a) poor fencing or b) poor gates (some of these were poorly designed and could be climbed over or crawled under; others were not strong enough to resist a kick).

Crime preventers and promoters

Some residents had put up their own fences and gates. However, many were weak, as said, and the choice by some individual households not to do so meant that the whole interconnected area was vulnerable. In effect this represented an absence of collective action at the community level.

Offender perception/decision

No special information was collected on **offenders** (their criminality, motives, resources or presence) but we can assume they perceived little effort to reach the rear of the houses (and to break in), little risk of being observed and caught whilst approaching, breaking in or escaping, and sufficient reward.

2. Intervention

Interventions, remember, are **how the action works**. These interventions can be close to the criminal events in time and space (such as deflection of violent encounters between groups of young people by establishing a youth club) or remote (such as a 'developmental' intervention addressing an early childhood risk factor like school failure). But they all act through the same generic intervention principles which correspond to the 11 causes identified through the CCO [Figures 2-3].

Intervention principles

Interventions on the offender side act through several broad principles:

- a. **Reducing criminality** - intervening in early lives to reduce known risk factors, enhancing known protective factors through family, school and peer groups; and supplying remedial treatment for those already convicted
- b. **Supplying resources to avoid crime** - training offenders in social and work skills

- c. **Reducing readiness to offend** - changing offenders' current life circumstances - alleviating drug addiction problems, poverty, unemployment, stressors like poor housing, and conflicts
- d. **Restricting resources for offending** - control of weapons, skills, tools and information on crime targets, and transfer of criminal know-how
- e. **Deterrence** - raising perceived risks and costs of detection; discouragement - making the effort to offend seem too great and the reward too small; awakening conscience
- f. **Excluding offenders** from crime situations - eg keeping young offenders out of football stadia, attracting them into youth clubs, holding them under curfew (or in prison)
Interventions on the situational side act through several more principles:
- g. **Target hardening, target removal, value reduction** for the goods stolen or damaged in property crime
- h. **Perimeter access and security** of buildings and other enclosures (as in burglary prevention)
- i. **Environmental design, planning and management** including aiding surveillance (by landscaping or by technology such as lighting or CCTV), resolving conflicts and setting rules
- j. **Boosting preventers** - their presence, alertness, competence, motivation and responsibility -through formal control (like patrolling), informal social control, supplying positive role models for offenders, or self-protection and avoidance for victims
- k. **Discouraging and deterring crime promoters** and awakening their conscience - through naming and shaming, civil liability, prohibiting rechipping of stolen mobile phones, tackling criminal subcultures, procedural controls or market reduction including cracking down on fences

Intervention principle 1

The first principle selected in Stirchley was to improve and/or create effective target enclosures around each block of houses. The practical methods used were to design and install alleygates (method 1) and fencing (method 2). The conjectured mechanisms by which these methods would work, included:

- * Blocking access to vulnerable and unsurveilled rear of houses
- * Reducing escape routes
- * Thereby making it easier for residents to act as preventers and
- * Deterring and discouraging offenders through perception of increased risk and effort

Intervention principle 2

The second principle was to lower the value of target goods to the offenders and increase the risk of possessing or selling them. The practical methods used (method 3) were property marking with an ultraviolet pen, supported by a guidance booklet and a window sticker. The conjectured mechanisms included:

- * Helping residents to act as preventers by marking their property
- * Helping purchasers of goods to act as preventers, and hindering them from acting as promoters, by enabling them to identify goods as stolen, and refusing to buy them or reporting to police
- * Deterring and discouraging offenders through perception of increased risk and effort, and reduced reward; amplifying this through window stickers

Intervention principle 3

The third principle was to aid preventers by the method of communicating general crime prevention messages through a newsletter (method 4). Conjectured mechanisms were obvious and included:

- * Helping preventers protect their own and neighbours' property
- * Deterring and discouraging offenders by communicating that preventive action was occurring in the neighbourhood (some residents visited by police may themselves have been burglars)

Methods 3 and 4 also served to mobilise and maintain the confidence of residents in the short term (which comes under Insertion).

What countermoves by offenders were anticipated, and how were they counteracted?

Offenders' countermoves are important in determining the success or the durability of the intervention, and it is important to anticipate them, and counteract where possible. Countermoves to situational prevention include **displacement** (offenders using different tactics, attacking in different places and at different times, or even changing to

a different target of crime). Offender-oriented prevention is not immune from countermoves. **Offender replacement** is the equivalent problem. For example, if the police arrest and remove the local drug dealer, or even if he is reformed by some kind of youth work project, if the empty niche in the market remains safe and rewarding, another offender often fills it.

In Stirchley, the project implementers simply accepted that such a geographically small project would run the risk of displacement of various kinds. However, action was still judged worthwhile, because displacement is rarely complete (remember that you are displacing offenders from the easiest, safest and most attractive targets), so there is usually a net reduction in crime. Furthermore, there are grounds for sharing the pain of burglary so that it does not always concentrate on the same unfortunate households or areas.

By contrast, the UK national mobile phone project sought to prevent further theft and robbery through a diverse set of methods which anticipated a number of countermoves and closed off the loopholes in an approach which looked at the whole national system and its vulnerabilities, not just the phones or their owners. Our traditional national approach has been to try to displace a given crime problem across the English Channel to Calais, but there is now some useful scope for acting collectively at the EU level to protect the whole territory.

The phone project has also in effect put in place a **scanning capacity** to rapidly detect and respond to new modus operandi as the thieves and fences try to circumvent existing preventive methods.

3. Implementation

Implementation is **what is actually done** - how the practical methods that realise the principles in locally-appropriate ways are targeted, converted into action on the ground that is directed at an appropriate 'social level', and monitored.

How was the action targeted on the crime problem, offender, place and victim? This section describes the principles used to target the action to where it was needed or would have best effect. (I should say that we have some potential confusion of terms here - preventers are targeting offenders and crime situations for intervention, while offenders are targeting people, places and property for crime; and we also have 'crime reduction targets' like 'cut burglary by 10% in 2 years'. Maybe we need some other

terms.) The most widely-used way of describing targeting strategies in crime prevention is the 'public health' classification, as modified by Jan van Dijk and Jaap de Waard (1991) to cover not just offenders but situations, which I take to include victims:

- * **Primary** targeting focuses on the general population as potential offenders, treats all environments as potential scenes of crime or all people and material goods as targets or victims of crime
- * **Secondary** - focusing on people at particular risk of offending, on targets at risk of victimisation or on places likely to set the scene for victimisation. (Obviously, the risk factors mentioned under intelligence are appropriate indicators for targeting.)
- * **Tertiary** - focusing on people already convicted or victimised, or targets and scenes of existing crime (linking to the concepts of repeat victimisation, repeat or persistent offending, and hot-spots).

What social levels did the action target?

Crime prevention methods act on, or through, a diverse set of 'entities' in the real world. These range from the individual offender or target of crime, to family, peer group, institutions such as schools, companies or hospitals, the media, geographical areas, markets or a community. Here they are called 'social levels'. It's important to capture this information, because the practitioners designing and implementing a project could become confused if, for example, they try to replicate a method which was designed for intervening at the area level, on the basis of individual households alone. If we combine our picture of targeting through primary, secondary and tertiary with the kind of crimes and causes addressed, and the social level of action, we have a pretty comprehensive description of the implementation framework of the project.

In Stirchley, targeting was tertiary and focused on situations - aiming at known burglary hotspots. In terms of social levels, the intervention methods were directed at all residents within a specific geographical area, to tackle causes of crime acting mainly at geographical area-level. (This in fact evolved into implementation and insertion at the community-level, given the collective nature of the intervention and the outcome.)

What inputs of funds, effort and human resources went into the project?

We next need to describe the principal inputs into the project of funds, effort, human resources and capacity-building such as the supply of equipment and training. It may also be helpful to state the sources of the inputs (such as funds from a charitable

organisation or academic expertise from a university) if the information is relevant to replication of the project as a whole, or an element which may be worth copying independently.

In Stirchley, the 'crude input costs' amounted to some £127000 of which two-thirds was equipment (mainly the gates and fences). Personnel costs (mainly for police time) were just under a quarter of that. As part of our Crime Reduction Programme, costs of projects were systematically collected. 'Modelling' the costs by economists to take account of inflation and the lifetime of the capital assets yielded a reduced input estimate of just over £40000. Human resources centred on the local community safety sergeant with the West Midlands Police, who became project manager. Other workers were bought in commercially or supplied by local government for installing the gates and fencing.

How did management, planning, and supervision help to convert the method into action on the ground?

A neglected area of implementation is simply the practical issue of making things happen on time, on cost, on target and to the right quality. Project management capacity is a vital consideration for replication, and a major source of risk of drift and implementation failure if it is absent. It becomes especially significant if there is multi-agency collaboration, or partnership working, to coordinate.

Back in Stirchley, a project steering group included representatives from the police, probation service, Birmingham City Council and local residents. The project benefited from a single manager - the police sergeant - who provided consistency, continuity and dedication, who had good prior relations with the residents and who regularly visited the target areas to ensure people were locking the gates. The downside of this, however, was the risky dependence on one key individual, and his (initial) lack of procurement experience. I should say that he knows all about it now - and he's with us today!

What outputs were achieved?

Outputs are the tangible actions on the ground that implementation aims to deliver, and which are the physical means by which the interventions are attempted.

Depending on how the project is set up, we can measure outputs of both insertion. It

helps to break down the description of outputs by preventive methods. Once again, a couple of methods from Stirchley can illustrate this.

Method 1 - alleygates: 62 gates were installed, protecting an estimated 583 houses. Details of interest: gates fitted with a British Standard mortise lock, and in many cases, 'headers' to stop people climbing over the top. That's anticipating at least one tactical countermove.

Method 2 - fencing: 420m of steel palisade fencing were put up, estimated to have protected 90 houses.

Details of interest: land clearance was a significant cost element.

Method 3 - property marking: 400 property marking kits (UV pen, sticker, instructions) distributed to local residents. Half of households put the stickers on their front doors/windows. To be precise about this, the distribution was an output of insertion, the deployment of the stickers was an output of implementation.

Method 4 - newsletter: 400 newsletters x 4 rounds, distributed by resident volunteers. Again an output of insertion.

Monitoring, quality-assuring and adjusting the action in the light of feedback

It is useful to describe any arrangements for monitoring and quality assurance of the arrangements - especially where they are relevant to the replication of the project. Was the action delivered efficiently and effectively? Were arrangements in place to ensure that proper standards on human rights, data protection etc were followed? Did these raise any special problems which required special solutions? Reporting on any feedback process is particularly important because, as I said earlier, whether practitioners are replicating existing projects or innovating on the basis of principles, we have to adjust to the current context and to any background changes that may take place during the lifetime of the project.

There was nothing of interest that I picked up from the evaluators' report on Stirchley. However, in one of the UK's other projects, the YIP - this was part of a national programme, where programme integrity was seen as vital and a whole system of professional monitoring and evaluation was put in place.

The supporting environment for projects - infrastructure

In the background of any project is a local, regional or national infrastructure of resources and support such as training and other capacity-building activity, guidance, funding and operational information systems. The infrastructure may be strong or weak - but it is important to know what level of outside support a project was able to rely on. There is no point, for example, in a country with limited infrastructure trying to replicate a project which only works in well-prepared and fertilised ground, unless they are able to pay for these basics too.

It's said that the fish is the last animal to discover the existence of water. Likewise, it's difficult to obtain a clear picture of national and regional infrastructures for supporting local prevention without a specially-designed comparative study (one for AGIS funding, perhaps?).

Our UK project to reduce mobile phone robbery found it necessary to incorporate a fairly extreme piece of infrastructure, in the form of a new law to deter the re-programming of the identity codes of stolen phones. This gave added force to the range of other, civil, methods of prevention implemented.

Our Youth Inclusion Project was designed to promote programme integrity, in the knowledge that many youth crime programmes are prone to serious drift of objectives, so the designers developed a system of professional supporters and evaluators at both national and regional levels. Besides helping the programme to keep on track and the Youth Justice Board to know what the projects are doing, it enables projects to learn from each other, when representatives meet at regional and national events. This illustrates a happy mix of infrastructure involving dynamic top-down, bottom-up and horizontal learning and support.

4. Insertion of crime prevention in the community - mobilisation and partnership

Crime prevention professionals, like the police, often have to work through and with others rather than directly intervening themselves. **Mobilisation** is when those formally in charge of a crime prevention project mobilise other agencies, companies and individuals to play specific, limited parts in implementing the intervention. Apart from this top-down relationship, other approaches involve a more horizontal kind of collaboration, and very often, more permanent and explicit **partnership** arrangements.

Mobilisation

The boundaries of institutional powers and responsibilities may differ greatly between countries. So for replication from an international knowledge base, it's especially important to try to be explicit where particular mobilisation arrangements are critical to the success of a project; and if possible to centre on describing specific crime prevention **tasks** rather than broad roles of **institutions**.

The CLAMED process (Ekblom 2001) sets out a standard procedure for mobilisation. Clarify the crime prevention tasks to be implemented, Locate the individuals or institutions most suited to implement them, then **Alert, Motivate, Empower** and if appropriate, **Direct** them. In terms of collecting this information for a knowledge base, the entries are phrased a little differently.

First, Who are the individuals, agencies, companies, government departments or NGOs involved?

For each body **mobilised** to support the objectives of the project, we need to describe (where it is not obvious):

- * Who they are
- * What roles they play (or what tasks they carry out) in implementing or supporting crime prevention or community safety
- * Why they were especially chosen for the role (eg their competence, numbers, legitimacy)
- * How they were alerted to the role they could play in crime prevention (eg publicity, personal approach)
- * How they were motivated (eg regulations, legal duty, self-interest, naming and shaming, incentives)
- * How they were empowered (eg with training, equipment, information, guidance, money)
- * How (if relevant) they were directed (eg codes of conduct for confidentiality, performance and quality standards, crime reduction targets)

Broadly similar questions can be asked to identify why particular partnerships came together.

The CLAMED analysis is task-specific. But it is also important to capture information on the climate. So -

What was the wider climate of opinion in which the project was implemented

- * At the beginning, was the local climate hostile/suspicious or supportive/accepting of the project?
- * How, if relevant, was a positive climate encouraged and a negative one dispelled?
- * Can the methods employed by the project only work in a supportive climate?

Partnerships

Partnership is an institutional arrangement that shades into a philosophy. It is a way of enhancing performance in the delivery of a common goal, by the taking of joint responsibility and the pooling of resources by different agents, whether these are public or private, collective or individual. As many of you know, a committee of experts in the COE is nearing completion of some comprehensive recommendations to member governments on partnership working. For the present purpose, our interest in the partnership dimension is confined to the project's perspective: how that partnership environment helped, and/or directed, the creation and performance of the individual project.

The next stage, then, is to describe any partnership arrangements where these are necessary to understanding how the project came into existence, and how it was shaped, directed, supervised and supported. We are not specifically looking for good practice at partnership level. Now back, again to Stirchley.

Stirchley: Partnership

Police and city council were the main partners in this project, working through a wider steering group also involving residents (this was primarily consultative rather than decision-making). Once the project was under way, it is thought that the council was drawn into more active involvement because the residents' *expectations* of action had been awakened, and they were becoming impatient due to delays. *Problems* in partnership working arose because of a) lack of clarity over the funding between police and local council; b) lack of prior experience of police and council organisations and individuals in partnership working; c) initial reluctance of council officers to deal directly with police officer of 'only' sergeant rank, in the absence of senior police involvement. It should be stated that this project began very soon after the Crime & Disorder Act 1998 had come into force, and local government was relatively inexperienced in this kind of collaboration. But it became readily evident that the

council were the agency with the most experience of installing local infrastructure (such as fencing) and had the personnel best equipped to cope with the processes involved in implementation.

Stirchley: Mobilisation and collaboration

The most significant aspect of insertion in this project (and arguably the most significant distinguishing feature of the project as a whole) was the need to establish residents' *collective agreement on action*. One un-gated alleyway or one gap in the fencing could leave a vulnerability in the target enclosures that affected the interests of all. Not all residents initially favoured the gates or fencing. Agreement on gates required political will. It was achieved by meetings, and in particular the involvement of a local elected councillor with experience of gating, good links to business and contacts with/ influence on council officials. The gates, on private land, needed signed individual agreements with the residents/property owners, some of whom did not wish the gates imposed on them. The fencing, on public land, could be erected without this agreement (although meetings were arranged to try to establish consensus); but they did require planning permission, which was obtained. *A wider climate of understanding and support* was created by a range of public meetings and the newsletters (method 4). This and the property-marking initiative (method 3) *alerted/motivated/empowered* residents to act as preventers, but both methods were conceived primarily as means of creating and maintaining *credibility for continued collaboration* in the face of delays with gates and fencing. Involvement of the local Neighbourhood Watch coordinator, the local elected councillor and the chair of an existing residents' group were instrumental in getting ordinary residents involved and in securing agreement. It is possible their efforts also generated some additional 'social capital' which supported a more general *collective efficacy*.

In the UK mobile phone project, a key role in creating a *receptive climate* for the manufacturers and network operators to take collective preventive action was the publication of the major Home Office research study. It also provided *motivation* from public and political pressure.

5. Impact/cost-effectiveness and process evaluation

Obviously, describing some element of action as 'good practice' gains credibility if this was identified or confirmed by a formal, evaluation, preferably a **reliable and valid**

one. **Independence** from the implementers or funders is also desirable. However, we acknowledge that this is not always possible. And even the most sophisticated evaluation cannot rigorously test every aspect of a project.

We are interested in results from the two main aspects of evaluation. **Impact** evaluation yields information on **what worked** in reducing crime and meeting the other objectives of the project. Ideally it also identifies **how it worked** (the principles/mechanisms), **what aspects of it worked** and **what contextual factors** contributed to success. **Process** evaluation delivers information on the quality of the entire Preventive Process, identifying all the significant problems and issues encountered and how they were dealt with, and checking whether any agreed standards (eg over data protection) were adhered to. The results of process evaluation are essentially presented under Intelligence to Insertion.

Impact evaluation can be extended into **cost effectiveness** assessment. Cost effectiveness studies are still rare in crime prevention, but if any are submitted it would help to define terms here.

Input comprises all the **funds, effort, human resources and capacity-building** such as equipment and training. It includes 'subsidies' from infrastructure.

Output comprises all the actions done by the various people which include, or directly contribute to, inserting and implementing the intervention in the causes of the crime problem or manipulating the equivalent risk and protective factors. For example, this could include the numbers of crime prevention surveys done to homes at risk of burglary, the numbers of youth clubs set up to divert young people from violent encounters in the town centre, or the time spent on a knife amnesty.

Intermediate outcome comprises the immediate influence of the intervention on the causes or risk factors of the crime problem. For example, this could include the number of homes made secure to a particular quality standard, the number of young people successfully completing a course on aggression management at the youth club, or the number of knives collected during the knife amnesty.

Impact, or ultimate outcome is the extent to which the project reduced crime and met its other objectives. In practice, outputs and intermediate outcomes may sometimes refer to the same achievements. But the important difference is whether the tangible action measured (output) can be judged to have triggered the mechanisms of

prevention. In the earlier illustration, when the match was struck (output) did it actually catch fire (intermediate outcome), and did that fire ignite the wood (impact)?

Cost effectiveness is the ratio of impact to input - for example, an estimate of how many crimes were prevented per £1000 of input.

Back to Stirchley,

This project was subjected to an independent impact, process and cost-effectiveness evaluation by South Bank University and collaborators in the Southern Consortium engaged to assess the Burglary Reduction Initiative of the Crime Reduction Programme in England & Wales. The *impact evaluation* design involved comparing changes in recorded burglary statistics over some 3 years, in a) the target areas; b) the rest of the Stirchley police beat (the 'buffer' area used to assess geographical displacement), and c) the rest of the King's Heath operational command unit ^a(the 'reference area' used to indicate general background trends).

The overall **objective** of the project was to achieve a 50% reduction in burglary in the target areas and a 10.5% reduction in the Stirchley Beat as a whole, 'against previous years' figures'. The first objective was achieved with a 53% fall in domestic burglary from year -1 to year 1. For the whole of the Stirchley beat there was a 7% fall from year -1 to year 1. By year 2, the second objective was reached, with a 45% fall relative to year -1. However, it is plausible that some (but by no means all) offending in the target area was displaced from domestic burglary to burglary of *non-dwellings* such as commercial buildings. However, there may have been geographic 'diffusion of benefit' into the buffer area, perhaps because local offenders thought the whole area was too 'hot' to operate in. More details are in the complete project description.

Cost-benefit analysis was a special feature of this and other projects in the UK Crime Reduction Programme. It was estimated that 21 burglaries were saved in the target areas relative to the expectation derived from the wider King's Heath reference area. Using these estimates of burglary savings multiplied by the national cost estimate per burglary to the household (nearly £3300), set against the 'modelled' costs of the project, suggested that the project was beneficial. There were several alternative estimates based on different assumptions. One typical attempt suggested that for every £1 of resources used, £1.72-worth of resources were saved. Diffusion of benefit increases this figure; taking account of functional displacement to non-domestic

burglary however neutralises it. However, displacement is a sign that burglars are 'on the run' from the preventive interventions. Certainly, the residents of Sturchley felt the benefit. The true test of displacement is what happens when all the local vulnerable points are made secure at reasonable cost.

To add to the fairly happy endings in the UK examples, the Youth Inclusion Project also appeared effective. However, at the time of writing it's too soon to tell with the mobile phone project, although insertion and implementation seemed to work and there are well-developed plans to evaluate it.

Replicability

Finally, I think it's worth ending the project description by returning to highlight issues to consider when judging if replication is appropriate in the user's different context.

For Sturchley, these issues include:

- * the **community context** of residents' willingness to collaborate on collective action
- * the **administrative/ legal context** of urban planning regulations for the installation of common fencing etc
- * the **balance of public and private ownership** of housing
- * the **architectural design and layout** of the housing

The five I's in practice

How did things work out in practice with the 5Is? Like those intrepid medical researchers in the last century who injected themselves with diseases and vaccines, the best way was to try it on myself - and not so heroically, on some unlucky colleagues.

Perhaps the most important finding was that the schema didn't collapse - **5Is appeared to work** convincingly for myself, my colleagues and the evaluators and practitioner involved in the burglary project at least.

But the first thing I noticed in trying 5Is out was that it was **hard, concentrated effort**. The burglary description took me about 2 days to boil down from an 80 page evaluation report. I also put in several days editing the other two, although it began to get easier with experience. **Familiarity with the details of the 5Is framework, and how to use it** in practice, thus seems important: this is not something a person can do without tutoring. All in all, the experience reminded me of the discipline required to write up a traditional journal article systematically and rigorously describing some

experimental method and results - except that this time, the purpose was one of capturing and conveying that information, not to academics but to practitioners.

There were some problems with **reliability** - particularly with mechanisms and principles, and with insertion and implementation. My colleagues sometimes took these terms to mean different things, and occasionally even I had trouble deciding. Some further work on **clarifying definitions** would be needed.

Both these observations suggest that if something like this exercise were to be done routinely and on a widespread basis, whether within one country or across Europe, this would need some sort of **tutoring package**, and once people were completing entries, some sort of **on-line interactive guidance**. Perhaps this could involve **choice trees**, like the guides that botanists use to systematically identify plants by their features, and **pop-up definitions**. Some years ago, I developed a system rather like this to classify 2000 projects from our Safer Cities Programme - and after tutoring a student was able to use it quite successfully.

I also needed to draw on my fairly broad experience of crime prevention in order to **highlight, and draw out, the aspects which were significantly newsworthy, and important for sharing** and replicating on this specific type of project and more generically; and to **bring the principles and mechanisms to the surface**. Similarly, I was continually using my **professional judgement on the quality of evidence**. Therefore, this is not a job for a 'knowledge manager' with no understanding of the issues - let alone for secretarial staff.

On a related point, the systematic and rigorous approach to coverage favoured by 5Is inevitably meant going **back to original sources** to fill in missing information or clarify confusion.

The **structure** of the project description initially gave me some trouble. How to follow the complexity of actions organised in very different ways in different projects whilst being systematic in the information I recorded or edited, and making for a storyline that was reasonably readable? I then realised that I could abandon a rigid order and allow some **flexibility**. All that was necessary was to make the **headings** consistent (and searchable), wherever they were. I was then free to do things like an **overview** of methods (in the phone project) to show how they all contributed to a common secure system, before describing each one in detail. In this respect, we are not

really developing a set of rigid compartments on an Ikea cupboard, but a kind of **language or grammar for expressing how to do prevention.**

I also allowed some redundancy to come in, because the same action sometimes served several functions and had to be referred to under each heading. For example, a public consultation exercise in the burglary project served both to supply Intelligence and to help Insertion by maintaining a climate of acceptance.

But I think that the most surprising thing about the Stirchley example was this. Here was a very simple set of crime prevention methods, using simple and well-researched principles. The focus of the method could be described in a single sentence - blocking burglars' access to the rear of houses by putting gates on the alleyways. But the range and complexity of the action and support needed to convert the idea into reality was enormous - a full five pages' worth of systematic description to guide replication.

Conclusions: Is it worth the effort?

From my description of the principles and practice of designing a knowledge base that is really useful to practitioners, I'm sure many people will question the effort and the level of expertise that seems to be necessary. I have two main responses to this. First, two days' work on a decent project description could just save several months', and several thousand Euros' worth of wasted effort, opportunity and credibility on just one new project that is better designed as a consequence. Implementation failure remains a serious risk in crime prevention programmes, as much research has shown and is still showing. (And if the worst does happen, we can use 5Is as a framework for **failure-mode analysis** - at which stages did things go wrong, and how can we learn from this?) Second, when we collect information on individual projects, there are many **off-line** uses for it if the quality is good enough:

- * It can be used in training exercises, and
- * As raw material to feed into the synthesis of principles and theories. Such synthesis is an extremely important addition to systematic reviews such as those of the Campbell collaboration. Practitioners and policymakers need resolution where, for example, different evaluations seem to give opposing results, which could be due to error, to the operation of fundamentally different principles or simply to interaction of interventions with different contexts. Here, in effect, the knowledge base of project descriptions becomes a database for analysis and synthesis.

- * In fact, the architecture, the headings and the categories of a well-designed knowledge base actually embed the principles and concepts in the structure, and can reinforce the practitioner's learning every time it is used.
- * The material can also be used to support gap analyses so that new research and development can be planned.
- * Higher-level policy can use the collected case studies to conduct strategic overviews of the types of intervention that work, and indicate the kinds of contexts where intervention can expect to succeed, and the kinds of practical support and climate which need to be created to make them work in the mainstream. Of course, not every user of this knowledge will want it in such detailed and systematic form. But the good quality information is there on which simpler briefs can be prepared as appropriate for strategic policy-makers, journalists or whoever.
- * Finally, back to practice, the typical knowledge base is used retrospectively to collect information after the implementation and evaluation of a project. However, the same framework could be used prospectively as a business-planning and appraising tool, at a number of stages during project development and implementation. It can be used to guide the design and planning of projects, and the assessment of proposals for funding. Once the proposals are accepted the framework can guide quality assurance of implementation, and monitoring of progress. If practitioners only have to learn one schema for all this, they are saved a great deal of effort. Moreover, the utility of the framework at all stages means that the quality of information entered by the practitioners may be better. We all know of cases where entries on a programme's management information system are hastily filled in by the secretary at the very finish of the project in response to urgent demands from the centre.

Clearly, a good knowledge base is worth investing in, both nationally and at European level, because it has the potential to serve all these purposes. I'm a firm believer in the principle that a high level of investment in knowledge and other infrastructure is necessary for a high yield in terms of successful performance in crime prevention. For me, it's a lot of effort, but worthwhile. Simple, newspaper-style descriptions of success are vital to convince other audiences such ordinary citizens, taxpayers and businesses of the value of crime prevention, and should be encouraged (and with busy policymakers and industrialists, who have little time or inclination to read, verbal

communication or 'selling' ideas is also important) But these are entirely different tasks. For sharing professional good practice in ways that help replication and innovation they are simply not enough. Let me invite you to look at the detailed project descriptions - and come to your own judgement on whether the approach I have been developing adds value in all these ways, and whether you therefore think that we should take this experimental process further. And please send me feedback!

Last of all, why the 5Is? It's from a poem of that name, by Walter de la Mare. It begins:

*In Hans' old mill, his three black cats
Watch his bins for the thieving rats.
Whisker and claw they crouch in the night
Their five eyes smouldering, green and bright.*

Suitably Southern European-sounding author, suitably Northern European-sounding miller - and it's got theft and violence in it!

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

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
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Figures 1, 2 and 3





Workshop A1

Youth Violence/Ethnic Minorities.

Chair: Monika Olsson, Sweden

Rapporteurs: Annette K. Pedersen and Lene Mortensen, Denmark

Participants:

Thomas Schweizer, Austria	Patrick Hebberecht, Belgium
Tim Bremmers, Belgium	Pia Borg, Denmark
Susanne Clausen, Denmark	Kim Hansen, Denmark
Peter Hindsberger, Denmark	Jens Frederik Kragholm, Denmark
Willem Aldershoff, European Commission	Sirkka Perttu, Finland
Markku Heinonen, Finland	Pascale Bruston, Franceanti,
Michel Marcus, France	Anja Meyer, Germany
Norbert Trabs, Germany	Konstantina Ifanti, Greece
Tonino Lodewijk, Netherlands	David Walker, Ireland
Cristina Milagre, Portugal	Ruth Erdelyiova, Slovak Republic
Jerzy Sarnechi, Sweden	Radim Bures, Czech Republic
Simon Hickson, United Kingdom	Drew Peterkin, United Kingdom

Summary of discussions

16 descriptions of good practice on preventing youth violence, or related issues, had been submitted by the Member States and were discussed by this workshop. Brief presentations were made of most of these good practices.

Participants agreed to discuss the submitted good practices on the basis of the UK-Ekblom model of the five stages of the preventive process, that is Intelligence, Intervention, Implementation, Insertion and Impact.

Participants agreed also on the importance of discussing how to continue with exchanges of good practice within the EUCPN.

Intelligence

It was noted that few of the descriptions of good practice submitted to this workshop, gave any details concerning the gathering and analysis of information about the crime problem.

Participants agreed that ideally a set proportion of the budget for a project should be spent on gathering information on and analysing the crime problem, before deciding on suitable interventions etc.

It was pointed out that initial information gathering and analysis is a necessary prerequisite for evaluating the outcomes of any project.

Intervention

Participants agreed that whenever possible interventions should be based on a solid theoretical ground and on the current criminological and other relevant knowledge about the causes of targeted problems and effectiveness of interventions.

Some of the good practices focused not only on the offenders or youths at risk, but on the victims of youth violence. Participants agreed that this was important, as the distinctions between offender and victim were in many instances artificial. Young people who were violent often ran a greater than average risk of victimisation. Equally, young victims of violence were more likely to become offenders themselves, so they were particularly in need of support from the society to reduce such negative consequences.

Many of the projects described experiences with social training programmes. Participants noted that some of these had demonstrated significant effects in reducing the crime problem. It was agreed that although it is important to use programs that have shown to be effective, it is also important to adapt such interventions to the individual youths.

It was noted that few of the submitted good practices concerned early intervention. The discussion revealed a great need for further exchange between the Member States in this respect.

Implementation

Concerning the identification of risk groups or risk youth, participants agreed that this element is complicated and requires further elaboration in the development and exchange of good practice.

Insertion

A partnership was a prominent feature of many of the submitted good practices. There was unanimous agreement that partnerships between different agencies, non-governmental and other organisations, the research world, the business sector and the civil society is a key to success. The importance of choosing partners according to the objectives of the project and of making roles and responsibilities clear was highlighted.

Impact and process evaluation

Although all of the submitted good practices had been perceived as being successful, few of them had been scientifically evaluated. There was unanimous agreement between participants that one very important aspect of the exchange of good practices is the evaluation of the implementation and of the effects, particularly related to the perceived crime problem.

It was recommended that all crime prevention projects should be internally evaluated. Projects of importance should be externally evaluated.

Future work on good practice within the EUCPN

Participants agreed that several of the active elements of the good practices submitted to the workshop could be used in other Member States and that the EUCPN should continue to prioritise the exchange of good practices.

There was unanimous agreement that in the future the EUCPN should select a few projects of principal importance for the exchange of good practices, with the aim of elucidating best practices. It was suggested that the knowledge and experience of the research contact points of the EUCPN should be used in preparing material for the EUCPN.

The participants agreed that the guidelines developed by UK (Paul Ekblom) was very useful in exchanging good practices and that this work should be further elaborated for the use within EUCPN.

Workshop A2

Youth Violence/Ethnic Minorities

Chair: Lars Rand, Denmark

Rapporteurs: Charlotte Vincent and Lene Vang Joensen, Denmark.

Participants:

Michaela Schneider, Austria	Ulf Göransson, Cepol
Ronni Abergel, Denmark	Per Dalgaard, Denmark
Bent Haagensen, Denmark	Claus Hilborg, Denmark
Pia Hostrup, Denmark	Marete Kromann, Denmark
Poul Løhde, Denmark	Peter Uldall, Denmark
Christian Henry, Europol	Muriel Eglin, France
Frank Beckmann, Germany	Gunter Kase, Germany
Volkhard Schindler, Germany	Vera Cozzoline, Italy
Smakman Antonius, Netherlands	Carlos Ferreira, Portugal
Teresa Montana São José, Portugal	Pilar Alvarado, Spain
Jonas Øberg, Sweden	Gordon Barclay, United Kingdom
Judy Renshaw, United Kingdom	

Lars Rand Jensen suggested that ideas and comments should be structured in relation to the 'five I'es' and the provided questions. A participant from the UK stressed that the questions were too general and suggested focusing on risk groups and primary prevention and hereafter moving on to more general questions. In that relation a national representative from Germany suggested to start with presentations of the specific examples.

In the first half of the workshop the participants gave accounts of the projects. Comments and questions to the projects were discussed in the workshop.

Günther Kase from Germany lead off with a presentation of one of the German projects (Prevention in Teams: PIT). By asking people in the workshop to get together in pairs and touch each other's ear lobes, Kase wanted to demonstrate the range of different possible feelings people experienced (anger, laughing etc.) doing such an

exercise. This is an example of living experience. It is important learning to realise emotions and feelings and express these feelings in words, then, being able to express what is going on with you (It is more difficult for boys doing this). An important part of conflict management.

Kase then moved on to tell about the four parts of PIT, which are described in their project description.

Smakman Antonius from the Netherlands moved on to tell about the Dutch project. The project aims to build relations between authorities, the civilians and the police in a troublesome neighbourhood outside Amsterdam with a high percentage of Moroccan residents. This is an example of civilian initiatives creating security in the neighbourhood. Rates of criminality are now lower. Antonius stressed that the success of this project is related to the fact that the initiative came from the civilians living in the community supported by the government.

Thus, the Moroccan fathers are the key to the Moroccan society meaning that their primary involvement in the project established a contact to the police, making it possible for the police to talk to the Moroccan society about problems, which otherwise would be highly unlikely.

Judy Renshaw presented the UK Youth Inclusion project. The project is divided into 70 projects throughout the UK. The projects are locally based and locally targeted. The project presented aims to include the 50 most at risk youths in the local area into the society again. The programme provides alternative ways to include young people that otherwise are excluded from e.g. the normal school system (being thrown out etc.)

Renshaw stressed the importance of the one person running this specific project (co-ordinating different local authorities etc.). Renshaw also stressed the importance of school achievements. It is known that attending school are strongly correlated to delinquency. Thus, it is important to make educational support.

According to the Portuguese participant the Portuguese project is similar to the UK project. In Portugal they work with social mediation, which is known to be very successful. At the same time it was stressed that it is important to realise that a lot of crimes are not reported to the police (Approximately 70 per cent are not reported)

Franck Beckman then moved on to present the second German project concerning activities in school classes about violence (conflict resolution). The Braunschweig Model is a six-stage project that aims to train teachers and pupils to handle these issues. The

duration time for the project is 12-18 months in one school. For further information two WebPages about the project was referred to.

Muriel Eglin presenting the French project stressed that France usually does not address ethnic questions, because it is viewed to be racist. Thus, only matters related to discrimination are addressed. This project however, seeks to help foreign minors in legal rights matters. It is known to be a double problem being both ethnic and minor (minors can't call for legal rights).

The Lille -service that has been put down as a place of advice on legal rights acts as the mediator between the young person, parent or teacher and other institutions in relation to legal rights.

Anna Baldry from Italy talked about the position of the victim and the need to focus on victims. Baldry argued for the need to give juveniles alternative ways of action than legal action. The aim of the project is to increase the level of responsibility with the offender. In relation to this social workers are trained as mediators and volunteers. It is the decision of the victims and the judge whether the offence should be mediated or acted upon in normal ways.

Before the end of the first half of the workshop Lars Rand Jensen summed up and points to be discussed after lunch were agreed on.

Discussion points:

- * Is it possible to say something interesting about the work with minority groups?
- * Evaluation
- * Personality (The importance of personality of the people working with the projects)
- * How can we transform 'good practice' from one place and situation to another?

(Replication)

- * Age groups and intervention time

Second half:

The aim of the second half was to formulate conclusions that are not too binding.

Firstly the practitioners' position were shortly discussed.

In the intervention it is important to hear the practitioners' experience and it is valuable when practitioners come to the floor and tell about their experiences. Broadly it was the opinion that to develop a European crime preventive network, practitioners

must attend the workshops together with academics and people with other backgrounds in order to add valuable conclusions and reflections to the record.

Discussion points:

Replication:

In relation to the question of replication an UK participant stressed the difficulties of replication even within one's own country. In relation to this it was stressed that there is a need for someone to keep an eye on the principles. A framework helps replication in other countries. France pointed out that experience cannot be replicated, but elements can be picked up and used in other contexts.

It was suggested that a database would be valuable for practitioners across Europe, where they can contact each other and pass on good ideas and experiences.

The work with minorities:

The chairman (Lars Rand Jensen) told about a Danish experience where Denmark for a period tried to split minority groups. However, Denmark now works with groups, as it is known that minorities are more secure in a group. The Netherlands (Antonius) points out that youth in a group are very strong, while a juvenile alone is weak. He suggested that a powerful group is also powerful to the environment.

Age groups and intervention time:

Germany (Günther Kase) compared the crime preventive work with a person wiping up a wet floor, while the water is still running. E.g. he stresses that children to a great extent have negative role models from TV. TV is a part of the running water and practitioners cannot prevent without taking this issue into account.

Lars Rand Jensen points out that practitioners often clean up instead of preventing. There is a need to give young people tools to survive in the future in order to cope with all the different sources of influences they daily are bombed with (TV, Internet etc.).

Denmark (Bent Haagensen) points out the role of parents and suggests that the biggest problem is to include the parents in the field of crime preventive work.

End of workshop - summing up

With this form of projects it is important that practitioners have the opportunity to present - in depths - aspects of their projects.

In relation to this the participants in the workshop were asked if it is a good idea to divide the participants in future workshops into one workshop only for practitioners and one workshop only for e.g. researchers.

As stated earlier it was not recognised to be a good idea

Main discussion topics:

1. Can we say something interesting about the work with ethnic minorities?
 - There are different opinions about what works and what does not work. E.g. it depends on culture and country how you deal with immigrants. The concept of ethnic minority is non-existing in France, as it is traditionally viewed to be racist.
2. Can we say something interesting about evaluation?
 - * It is important to evaluate
3. Can we say something important about the importance of personality in relation to the project process?

Important elements (elements from a specific German project)

- * Personal authority
 - * High degree of self-consistency
 - * Respect for the personality of the young people
 - * Empathy
 - * Sensibility (not up - down process)
4. Can we say something about replicability in different cultural contexts?
 - * Replicability should not be seen as a cookbook recipe. It is important to adapt to the local context. It may be more useful to talk about elements that can be picked up rather than experience that should be replicated.
 5. Can we say something about age and the time for intervention?
 - * It is important to give young people tools to survive in the future, because of all the influences (including negative role models) they are daily bombed with through e.g. TV, Internet etc. Thus, crime prevention may be insufficient unless you equip the youth to handle and take action themselves upon the multiple influence they get bombed with.

Workshop B1

Domestic Burglary

Chair: Hille Koskela, Finland

Rapporteurs: Anne Marie Skovsgaard and Claus Peter Hansen

Participants:

Frédérique Haleng, Belgium

Henning Dahlfelt, Denmark

Ole Scharf, Denmark

Sakari Kivimäki, Finland

Dominique Dalier, France

Pál Baán, Hungary

Jean L. Clement, Luxemburg

Angel Estevez, Spain

Gabriella Sandstig, Sweden

Merete Watt Boolsen, Denmark

Aage Nørgaard Jensen, Denmark

Jaap De Waard, European Commission

Jukka-Pekka Takala, Finland

Annette Müller-Serten, Germany

Michelle Shannon, Ireland

Daniel Tatomir, Rumania

José Antonio Avila, Spain

Jessica Lundahl, Sweden

1: Different "Criminal cultures"

- 1) In some places the crime is organised, in others individual.
- 2) This should have an effect on the measures, regarding more or less intensive efforts, and whether international co-operation is requested/necessary.
- 3) Sensitivity on burglary is different according to the culture/country.

Finland: Huge cultural difference between EU countries, in their view of the image of burglaries.

In Finland the burglary rate is low. The image of domestic burglary is much worse in UK. In Finland the population does not take domestic burglaries serious.

Spain: Most of the burglaries are organised. People from Albania, Kosova etc.

Denmark: Motorcycle gangs and other organised groups are a huge problem relating to burglaries and robberies. People from Baltic countries stay in Denmark for a short term, performing criminal activities.

Sweden: Crime can be serious although not organised.

Hille Koskela: The further discussions going on in the EUCPN are primarily regarding the problem with organised crime.

France: Try to fight against burglaries only on local level - depending on what type of crime. National program of prevention can be transferred. Difficult to make populations participate in the fight against delinquency, because they often live a very individual (different) way of life.

Spain: Talking about different cultures. If the citizens feel more secure, they feel no need of security locks, take US as an (bad) example.

2: Localised knowledge

- 1) Localised knowledge is what is needed.
- 2) Localised solutions accordingly.
- 3) Community policing.

3: Knowledge

- 1) Knowledge is available -
- 2) And should be used in crime prevention advice and youth work.
- 3) Burglaries are most often reported because of insurances.
- 4) The police statistics give quite a good picture of this particular crime.

Ireland: Most burglaries are reported for insurance reasons. The fact that some people has no insurance, may cause that these, often poor people, feel a lack of interest from the police, if the knowledge regarding burglaries most often comes from the insurance companies.

4: Scales/Levels

- 1) Crimes link to each other
- 2) Prevention should take place on many scales.
 - Ex. "From youth work to security locks." and "From the grassroots to the international level."

Denmark: Crime is learned behaviour. Children pick up habits by watching. In the Danish project we try to build a network, including schools the social system and the parents. Good idea to involve the family as a whole. It has a positive effect on younger sisters and brothers when older sisters/brothers is prevented from a criminal career.

Finland: It is a problem if the citizens start to behave as police officers.

Denmark: We have a project in with groups of parents, marked with yellow coats, walk around in the streets at nighttime. It is not intended that the parents pretend to be police officers. Considered as a success, because it scares off young people from making crime, when adults they know from the neighbourhood are around.

Hungary: Have a similar project with small groups of local people. No interests in money. Patrolling in their own territory. Similar to neighbourhood watch. From afternoon till midnight. Preventing criminals from especially car steeling. The citizens are familiar with the patrolling. Police unable to do the patrolling, because of lack of money etc. Good results.

Ireland: We have a project a bit similar to "neighbourhood watch". People feel more secure, because of the knowledge of for examples, where to put your money. Physical protection was very important.

Spain: Facing very professional organised groups. Neighbourhood watch is interesting. No groups as in Denmark and Hungary. The high level of burglaries causes fear in the population. Lack of security. To protect people - information to the householders - measures to be taken to protect themselves.

Sweden: Primarily, most work is done on the local level. Initiatives to be taken depend on the local level.

5: Safety/Security

- 1) A long-term perspective is needed.
- 2) Safety is an important aim as such.
- 3) Too hard measures demand you to take into account that there may be problems with too much security.
- 4) Hard measures may increase violence.

Denmark: Terrifying if our houses are turned into personal prisons caused by fear, in control of the surroundings, and no relations to our neighbours.

If you make use of surveillance cameras the burglar will have to use a mask, and so on. But unfortunately the only way to make the old lady feel safe is to tell her that the burglar has been jailed. She doesn't care whether the man who bought the ring or radio has been caught.

Finland: How do we solve the problem with a person who does not want a protection fence in the neighbourhood?

Denmark: If you can prevent youngsters from criminality, you won't need the defending fences etc. The fear of crime is a mental problem, not physical.

Ireland: Depending on circumstances, organised or minor criminality. - Especially elderly people fear criminality, even though others are more often victims. The police should inform on the local level, what measures to take, what to be afraid of and what not.

Denmark: Project in Aalborg. People felt insecure, then a lot of police officers were sent on patrol in the area, which resulted in an escalation of the fear. It was a problem that the police was too visible. Lack of information regarding the presence of the police, and even after the people were informed the fear did not disappear, because if so many police officers are around, something must be totally wrong.

Luxembourg: More important that people feel secure. If they feel safe, they don't care whether the rate of burglaries has increased by 100%.

Spain: It is hard to set up political solutions, because we are dealing with these organised groups. Therefore it is easier to put up surveillance cameras.

Denmark: Regarding surveillance cameras - in Denmark you must put up a sign "warning you" that you might be monitored, if you put up camera. The law stipulates that it is only allowed to put up cameras in restricted areas.

Sweden: In Sweden we also have a lot of rules regarding surveillance cameras. For example we have a national museum having problems with stolen paintings, and still the museum are not allowed to put up cameras.

France: Cameras particularly used in transport - Busses, trains. Police only has surveillance cameras in public areas.

6: Evaluation

- 1) First of all, evaluation is important as such, if you want to know which projects work.

- 2) Evaluation should go beyond statistics.
- 3) Evaluation should go beyond money.
- 4) Evaluation should focus on feelings of safety as well as on actual crime.
- 5) Evaluation is difficult because of:
 - a) Crime displacement
 - b) If you advise people to report crime, the figures will go up.
 - c) Statistics are not always comparable - international co-operation would be needed.

Finland: Are there difficulties in evaluating the projects?

Denmark: It is easy to count the number of burglaries, and the number of burglaries cleared up. But what if you had no project going on? What would the results have been?

Ireland: Lots of projects explain that the crime moves to other areas when a project has been set up in a certain area.

7: Innovation

- 1) Innovations should be encouraged.
- 2) A campaign saying: "Do not buy stolen goods!" may be as effective as traditional prevention measures.
- 3) A wide perspective to criminality is needed.
- 4) International co-operation should be more intensive.
- 5) What is normal practice somewhere may be an innovation in another country?
- 6) Therefore: No copyrights on good practice. Projects should be open.

Ireland: Innovation should be encouraged.

Finland: Although some good practice somewhere, not directly innovative, might anyway be a new and useful practice at another place.

Denmark: Trying to prevent common people from buying stolen goods might be better than to put up surveillance cameras?

Luxembourg: EUCPN - an open network, no copyrights.

8: Design

- 1) Learn from mistakes, and use the good examples.
- 2) The feeling of safety is an important factor.

Sweden: Town planning. Test area, big open areas, small entrances, not only residential houses but also working places, and official houses. The example from Sweden shows the great impact that good design has had on the crime rate in their project.

Finland: The best solution when it comes to design, may not be fences etc. But to build up defending space, as was done in the Swedish project. Other examples?

Denmark: Perhaps a good idea with large windows in the buildings. Criminals prefer to be able to hide.

Finland: You can design the area you live in, to prevent crime. If you have to pass several areas, public, semi-public, or private areas if you are to steal a car for example, it is difficult to leave the area unseen. A security alarm does not solve the problem if there is no problem in breaking in, and leaving the area unseen.

9: EUCPN

- 1) Today crime has no borders.
- 2) Crime across the boundaries needs international co-operation.
- 3) EUCPN makes it easier to focus on those projects, and on how we can make them work better.
- 4) Makes it possible to compare and evaluate studies on similar projects in different countries.

Sweden: What is the future role of the EUCPN?

Germany: Topics must be to continue the discussions from this and the other workshops.

Denmark: The parties who share the same problems must have the possibility to continue the discussions afterwards. Not all the projects are interesting for all the other participants. I suggest that we make a list of contact persons regarding the participants from this discussion. Next congress: To discuss the problem with the criminal activities crossing the borders.

All: Important to focus on the projects. We need this international corporation!

Workshop B2

Domestic Burglary

Chair: Poul Ekblom

Rapporteurs: Jean Marc Monnier and Christian Wiese Svanberg, Denmark

Participants:

Oluf Christensen, Denmark

Mervi Hyvärinen, Finland

Alexandre Bonneville, France

Ali Haroune, France

Bernard Cloosterman, Holland

Sean Hegarty, Ireland

Peter Lindström, Sweden

Wolfgang Barten, Germany

Heinrich Schulting, Germany

Nick Keane, United Kingdom

Chair: The Chair welcomed everyone and stated that he would try to continue the work from yesterday's plenary. The schedule for the meeting was presented. The chair wished to focus on knowledge issues and then specifically on burglary. The chair suggested that each participant in the meeting would be assigned one of the schemes that have been sent to the participants and present this to the workshop. The participants would then act as the advocate for the scheme they were assigned. Everyone was asked to introduce him or herself briefly.

After the introductions the chair noted that a mixture of governmental, private and police was represented which looked promising.

The chair wished to look at both knowledge and practice issues. The chair will introduce questions throughout the meeting, which will then be discussed by the workgroup.

It was suggested by the Chair that those, which had specific knowledge, were given those schemes, which harmonised with their knowledge.

The schemes were assigned.

Everyone was given 5 minutes to read the schemes they had been assigned.

The chair asked everyone to put themselves in the shoes of the practitioners before they presented their scheme. What do you think about the general level of details in the descriptions of the schemes?

Sweden: Asked that some times the motivation of the specific projects was not clear enough. It was not always possible to see why a specific project was chosen. It would be useful for projects to describe why they choose a specific approach.

United Kingdom: E.g. sometimes a project is labelled as a neighbourhood watch without it actually being a neighbourhood watch. Then the knowledge of the project becomes lost amongst all the other similar schemes. This is a problem.

United Kingdom also mentioned that replicability is a crucial but if the description is not good enough, then you are not able to see if it would work in another setting.

Finland: "Neighbourhood support" is not known in Finland.

Chair: Different countries have similar projects and a knowledge base needs to start at the bottom. We cannot assume that what is news in one country is news in another. The chair stated that the Luxembourg project did not contain enough information to be useful.

France: Had been assigned the Luxembourg project and agreed that there did not appear to be innovation in the project, but this could be because there was not enough information about the project. Hence the values of the project did not come out.

Chair: Concluded that the project was too thinly described. The Danish presidency stated that projects should be described in 5-10 pages. Is this enough? Or too little?

Germany: 10 pages are enough. Special projects can have more pages. But you just need the core of the project. On the other hand one page is not enough.

Chair: One needs to be able to read efficiently. Would a keyword searching system be good to include?

Sweden: We need the background of the project. What was the concrete problem that one wished to solve? What happened to make the country start the project?

Chair: What is background to one country may be foreground to another country. We could try to list the background information we need? Replicability? What conditions do we meet in our own area? What is relevant about property ownership? It was requested that everyone thought about this issue during the break.

(Coffee break)

Chair: The chair reconvened the meeting and noted that in Germany's scheme the practical problem is getting the house owners' attention.

Germany: The press plays a role in getting people involved and committed to the idea. The police goes out to the families and talk about safety and try to make them understand why it is sensible to have safety and why it is needed to use money on it. The problem is that the police officers did not learn this in school. The police needs good communication skills in order to convince people to let them into their home. Old people don't understand all the technical issues that are presented by the police officers. Furthermore behavioural prevention can be difficult to communicate.

United Kingdom: This touches on replicability. We used to mark property only in people's presence. Police officers both in this and the German example need to understand that communication is needed. Just sending out a letter or a pen for marking property is not enough. You need that extra information about what was said to people in order for a practitioner to be able to repeat the results.

Chair: We can conclude that describing the projects is important in order to repeat the projects.

Germany: We gave people a badge to show that they had followed the advice and to show recognition to the citizen, which had implemented the project. It also showed the criminals that this citizen was protecting his home.

Chair: One small detail can be crucial and quite huge once you focus on it.

United Kingdom: The five I's is relevant to our "SARA" program. "Insertion" did not sit within this program. It should be called "Integration". When you get a new idea you try to sell it to the citizens and the police officers. This is difficult. How do you get the idea integrated? Why does it not work in one place when it works somewhere else?

Chair: Motivation of the people is a big problem. SARA suffered from the problem that it lacked structure. How do you do it in a systematic way?

United Kingdom: A lot of practice in Europe and the United Kingdom is based on US ideas. If you can sell the simple idea then it will stick with practitioners. The problem is presenting complex ideas like the five I's to practitioners.

Chair: We can do this in two ways; a survival of the fittest which the US will win, or we can decide on a common plan. The worst thing would be many different ideas and projects. It is a hard choice. We need a final choice on frameworks, practitioners can't use too many different programs.

Sweden: We don't hear about SARA anymore in problem orientated policing. We thought it was no longer in use.

Chair: The Danish scheme talked about a process model. Maybe a working group should talk about this.

What information does practitioners need when transplanting programs to other programs?

Planning, building regulations? Planning system? Buildings and whole areas. New construction.

Architecture; houses vs. flats

The legal system?

Private or public property?

Culture? Is an area receptive to the police? Should others be involved?

Social and demographic data?

Historical dimension? Past and future trends. Economic trends and development.

Climate, day length.

We can recommend that background is vital for explaining why a project took certain initiatives. A lot of information is in the back of the head of those who created the project. We need to get this information out. We suggest that one efficient way to collect information is to use the EUCPN website. We could create a checklist for local practitioners and people using a knowledge base. A "Generic Replication Checklist".

Subsidiary: Could anything in regards to burglary be done on an EU-level? Could we create a radio transmitter to place in products on an EU level? Would this make sense?

Innovation: Does anyone think the projects that have been assigned to the members in the workshop are innovative? Or is it difficult to capture in a project description?

After the break lets focus on content. There is a list of content issues prepared by the hosts.

Finland: Some projects have undesirable side effects.

France: Modus operandi is also relevant.

(Lunch break)

Following the break the list of content issues was distributed.

Chair: Any comments on the list of issues.

Ireland: In regards to policing in remote areas we have seen that we need to link with the local population in order to make them aware of suspicious persons in the area and call the police. This was born out of necessity following a number of fatal burglaries some years back.

Chair: In England such a program would be difficult to present in the media without it appearing as if we are abandoning policing in rural areas.

Ireland: We needed to have information in the shape of measurements of the size of the problem. But this is expensive.

Chair: Anyone else that has problems with the costs of policing in remote areas.

Sweden: We start to use other private organisations to patrol. But this is also a problem.

France: We have reorganised the Rice in order to deal with these problems.

Chair: We could try to put together a proactive list.

Sweden: Often politicians hire more police officers when crime goes up. But other measures may be needed.

Chair: There may be a need to look proactively at which actions are needed on an EU level. If there is a common issue at EU level then something could get organised.

Finland: The big problem in Finland is theft from cars. Furthermore, Finland is a large country so it takes a while for the police to respond in some areas. Therefore neighbours begin patrolling themselves.

Denmark: In Denmark it was suggested that we had a chat room where police officers could communicate. Could this be used on the EUCPN website?

Chair: Anyone has any experience?

Ireland: We did a pilot program and the report is out soon. We could send that out to the EUCPN. A chat room would link us all Europe-wide and there would be a possibility to solve problems quickly by working together.

Chair: It is important to cater for both vertical transmission of knowledge to the centre and horizontal communication from practitioner to practitioner.

Sweden: The network could look into what the US has done.

Chair: We have to be aware that we draft in different ways for different audiences.

Going back to burglary: Does France have any further comments on modus operandi?

France: If we want a good study we need a list of how offences are committed.

Chair: Under "intelligence" we need to know what we are designing against. Is he armed with a stick or sophisticated equipment? If the problem in the knowledgebase is designed for a different kind of burglar you can't use the information and there is no replicability. If you over-engineer you are spending too much money.

We can conclude that it is crucial whether we are trying to tackle sophisticated criminals when we try to replicate.

Holland: We have a system where we set standards for home-protection by handing out a time-limited sticker to citizens. We can then sometime in the future when a new sticker is required take into account the new modus operandi of the burglars. All new buildings must be protected for 3 minutes.

Chair: Why 3 minutes?

Holland: We can't say.

Chair: So we need research on how long they will attempt to burgle a house. How does 3 minutes relate to the geography in the country? The climate and amount of daylight plays a role in replicability as well.

Finland: Summer cottages are vulnerable in Finland.

Germany: The Spanish projects we were given left messages for people to stay alert. In Germany we have similar programs where radio spots are used to warn people in the summertime before they leave for holiday.

Chair: Any details on how to do such programs well?

Germany: The police should do it all year round since burglaries come all year round.

Chair: You need to target your practice though. Any good practice points you want to mention before we finish. Or suggestions on how to do this meeting next time.

United Kingdom: Mobile phones can now receive messages when the alarm in your house goes off. This might be a good idea for the future.

Chair: New technology should be used.

Germany: We could award people financially/via taxes if they protect their houses.

Chair: The United Kingdom has similar schemes in regards to saving heat. If a shop wants to improve security of the shop it becomes more valuable and they have to pay more taxes. This is a disincentive and should be addressed. Incentives are also a good area for knowledge sharing.

We have managed to pull out some good areas. But is a meeting like this the best way to work in the future?

United Kingdom: It is a problem to be presented with projects that have not been evaluated, because how can you know if it is good practice?

Chair: Sometimes an idea remains just a good idea if we don't have the results that it produced. The question is getting a balance between the idea and the transmission of results. However, bad ideas can also be useful so that we don't make the same mistakes.

United Kingdom: A future best practice workshop needs a gatekeeper.

Chair: People could send in draft descriptions of projects and then people could point out what they want to know more about. However since the conference is always in October and the Presidency starts in July it is too short a time-period. Maybe an EU regularising should change the calendar.

Germany: Maybe it could be a suggestion to the people making the projects and make them send them out via the Internet. We could make a database accessible via password.

Denmark: Only problem is that one third filled in the registration for this meeting after the deadline. So we don't have time.

Chair: We are out of time. Thank you very much for a good meeting.

Workshop C1 + C2

Robbery motivated by Drug Addiction

Chair: Annika Snare, Denmark and Paulo Gomes, Portugal

Rapporteurs: Bent Lystrup Andersen. Charlotte Mathiesen Bech, Ilkay Yüksel, Denmark.

Participants:

Gabriele Loidl, Austria	Werner Tauber, Austria
Véronique Ketelaer, Belgium	Michel Thibaut, Belgium
Bert Vermeulen, Belgium	Johan Legarth, Denmark
Finn Borch Andersen, Denmark	Asger Janfelt, Denmark
Kurt Lerche, Denmark	Aksel Poulsen, Denmark
Wictoria Frick, European Commission	Stefan Gertman, Finland
Hannu Takala, Finland	Lotta Tuomo, Finland
Joséfina Alvarez, France	Sylvie Stankoff, France
Jörg Bässmann, Germany	Detlef Otto, Bönke, Germany
Geert Draaistra, Netherlands	Mary Burke, Ireland
Ciaran Kennedy, Ireland	Maria Grazia Vivarelli, Italy
Racardas Pocius, Lithuania	Pierre Calleja, Malta
Artur Ceia, Portugal	Daniel Tatomir, Rumania
Damjan Potpariè, Slovenia	Vincent Calvo, Spain
Andres Montero Gomez, Spain	Vincente Garcia Sanjuan, Spain
Carmen Pavon de Paula, Spain	Lars Alexandersson, Sweden
Nils Hänninger, Sweden	Rak Shita Patel, UK

The different projects that are being presented from the different countries aren't related with the heading. They only fit indirectly.

There are 9 different projects. Presenting recommendations aren't the purpose for the workshop. The idea is to sum up the discussions in the workshop.

The most structured guidelines are the 5 I's, which will be the guideline for the discussions.

Highlights from the Austrian project:

Addiction Prevention programmes. The idea is to avoid addiction of drugs and also alcohol. The addiction to alcohol will in the end result in drug-related crimes. Federal network in Austria. They are introducing an every day programme for the younger people. The police have a very important role in advising these people, and explain the results from of addiction.

Conclusion: Partnership with the police, the peer aspect ("young-to-young"), long term-project.

Belgium:

All the social organisations are working together in this project, Helping victims, support to prisoners in relation to re-integration in society. When young people end up in prison, some services will be available to make sure, that these younger people get the necessary help in order to re-establish a life after they have served their time. The target group will be drug-users.

Conclusion: Co-ordination/ co-operation - there is a co-ordinated partnership. The young drug-users aren't involved in several services, but only one.

Finland:

Robbery committed by ethnic minorities - typically by Somali youngsters. These young people had no education, and were just hanging around in the streets. A social worker, which was of Somali origin co-operated with the police in the investigation.

Conclusion: Co-operation between different authorities. Both law enforcement and social service are co-operating in this project. There isn't any connection between the drug -addiction and the robberies committed by Somali youngsters.

The Helsinki-project is not related to drugs. - Only street violence/ robberies.

There are lots of crimes that are linked to consumption and drugs. It is important to say that there isn't always a link between drug abuse and delinquency. However, some projects clearly show a link.

Main Conclusion: Co-operation between the social system and the law enforcement - raises some ethical problems.

France:

Common goals and co-operation between justice and health departments.

Conclusion: Inter agency co-operation - there are however ethical problems. Issues like the social services that get to know about a crime. Should they report this to the police?

Ireland:

Didn't use the five 5 I's, but concentrated on the evidence-based practice. This method is very similar to the 5 I's anyway. Which comes first? Criminality and then addiction to drugs or opposite?

Criminals don't think of the consequences of their acts, and are very risky in their behaviours. The project aim: No pressure, but the youngsters have to show willingness in co-operating. They are to follow a weekly session. The purpose is helping them strengthen their self-esteem, even though they have only realised failure until now. The youngsters are also involved in-group work. They are going to identify, how they are going to change and develop their own lives and opportunities. The programme will be created around the client and not like it is often seen - the client fitting in to the programme. Probation staff is looking after them.

Conclusion: "One-stop-chock"

Spain:

Building health, the school is the best location for putting through the project. The aim is to avoid drug abuse consumption and antisocial behaviour. The purpose with the programme was to delay the start of consumption of alcohol and tobacco. Also providing teenagers with personal and social abilities, so that they stay away from drugs and crime.

Netherlands:

Robbery of mobile phones. Stealing mobile phones by using violence. GSM-bomb. Sms's should be sent to the stolen mobile phone. This project went on very good. The robberies were committed towards youngsters under the age of 18. A new way was creating a film to inform the youngsters about this type of crime.

The aim is to make it less attractive to steal a mobile phone. All should use the security code - every mobile owner has this in their manual, but it isn't always being used.

UK:the

This project concerns robbery made by drug addiction. The work in Netherlands gave the idea for UK to start the project. The media got interested in the robbery of mobile phones, so that started the project. Working with the operators, networks and the police. Not the Sim-card but the phone (IMEI). Mobile manufacturers are involved too.

The aim is to get other countries to sign up the common database of mobile phone-theft.

A common European action is needed.

There should be more co-operations on EU-basis, EU and the authorities calling manufacturers. The only thing needed is to create more innovative technologies to prevent this sort of crime. Promoting co-operation between the member states.

An important point: If the EU cooperate on this matter, the crime/ stolen phones will move to another area - maybe in eastern Europe.

Sweden:

Another focus. The project can be more drug related than it seems, but it is not known at this moment. This was the most relevant project that Sweden could come up with in this field. Focuses on shops and stores. Some research has been conducted from the organisations including analyses on the subject.

How to intervene and remove the possibilities of committing these kinds of crime. It's up to the shop owners to gain security in this matter. There has been a checklist regarding better security of the shops. The minister of justice are in these days discussing methods to work further with this issue.

Conclusions: Police officers should be well trained, when they face this type of crime. It is important to know exactly how to act and tackle this type of crime.

Shop owners should be more involved in the project - all the actors should co-operate on the costs.

Properly evaluation is needed. Especially a common standard of evaluation on crime prevention projects is very important.

The project could start in a small part of the community and then be evaluated. The experiences could then be spread to the remaining part of the community.

Discussion:

Ipag Bässmann:

- Public parks a problem, because of the bad conditions, used needles etc.
- Police measures only aren't enough to get to the bottom of the problem.
- The city of Frankfurt offered a great deal of services for the drug users. Methadone clinics and other kinds of health services were provided.
- 147 drug related deaths earlier - after the approach the number was 36.

Comments from Mr. Paolo Gomes:

Implementing treatment measures and law enforcement measures are very important. The police can do a lot, if they appear on the spot.

Acting locally is very important. Local people should be able to discuss local problems and local approaches.

Local councils/ bodies should have operative powers to put things into practice. Discussing only is not enough. They should be given the operational tools to go into the field of the projects.

Gabriela Loidl:

Co-operation and learning how to work in network is important to prevent crime. If partners want to exchange information they have to co-operate.

Otto Bänche:

In which direction should the EUCPN go?

Josefina Alvarez:

Social prevention - we should go on with the discussion of this issue.

Drugs - what we are discussing are all kinds of drugs.

We have to define the lines for the EUCPN - work. Could we have contact points from the different actors involved with the projects?

The intention from the Danish presidency is to organise an annual conference. The Seminar/ conference is much wider than the network itself.

Victoria Frick:

AGIS - a new financial programme instead of the Hipokrates programme. The member states need information about this new programme.

Lars Alexanderson:

The difficulties in replicating the good examples. How thoroughly should the projects/ examples be described in order to be replicated?

Paulo Gomes:

People have to show some empathy. There is to be said something about the main issue of this workshop: Robbery motivated by drug addiction. - The purpose of the working shop is the prevention these type of crime.

Hanu Takala:

There is a lot of work going on regarding this type of crime, but not many of the efforts put in the work in this field is being tailored into concrete projects.

List of Participants

(The list of participants will be published as soon as possible)